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ABSTRACT
Interconnected power systems are prone to cascading outages leading to
large-area blackouts. Modeling, simulation, analysis, and mitigation of cascading
outages are still challenges for power system operators and planners.
Firstly, the interaction model and interaction graph proposed by [27] are
demonstrated on a realistic Northeastern Power Coordinating Council (NPCC)
power system, identifying key links and components that contribute most to the
propagation of cascading outages. Then a multi-layer interaction graph for
analysis and mitigation of cascading outages is proposed. It provides a practical,
comprehensive framework for prediction of outage propagation and decision
making on mitigation strategies. It has multiple layers to respectively identify key
links and components, which contribute the most to outage propagation. Based
on the multi-layer interaction graph, effective mitigation strategies can be further
developed. A three-layer interaction graph is constructed and demonstrated on
the NPCC power system.
Secondly, this thesis proposes a novel steady-state approach for
simulating cascading outages. The approach employs a power flow-based model
that considers static power-frequency characteristics of both generators and
loads. Thus, the system frequency deviation can be calculated under cascading
outages and control actions such as under-frequency load shedding can be
simulated. Further, a new AC optimal power flow model considering frequency
deviation (AC-OPFf) is proposed to simulate remedial control against system
collapse. Case studies on the two-area, IEEE 39-bus, and NPCC power systems
show that the proposed approach can more accurately capture the propagation
of cascading outages when compared with a conventional approach using the
conventional power flow and AC optimal power flow models.
Thirdly, in order to reduce the potential risk caused by cascading outages,
an online strategy of critical component-based active islanding is proposed. It is
performed when any component belonging to a predefined set of critical
vi

components is involved in the propagation path. The set of critical components
whose fail can cause large risk are identified based on the interaction graph. Test
results on the NPCC power system show that the cascading outage risk can be
reduced significantly by performing the proposed active islanding when
compared with the risk of other scenarios without active islanding.
Index Terms—Blackout; cascading outages; multi-layer interaction graph;
interaction graph; key link; key component; dynamic load flow; AC-OPA; DCOPA; AC optimal power flow considering frequency deviation; Northeastern
Power Coordinating Council (NPCC) Power System; under-frequency load
shedding.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1.1

Introduction
Power system is one of the most complex systems in the modern society.

The modern power system is approaching to the critical operating limits in the
environment of market. With the increasing of load demand, high capacity and
long transmission networks are widely used to meet the requirement. With the
integration of renewable energies such as wind and solar, the uncertainty,
intermittence bring bigger challenge to the operation of power system. Therefore,
a random outage or local outage may propagate and thus cause large-scale
blackout eventually [1].
Large blackouts, although infrequent, are costly to society with estimates
of direct costs up to billions of dollars. For example, a blackout happened in Aug.
14, 2003 in areas of Midwest and Northeast United States, and Ontario in
Canada. 50 million people are affected and the total cost of it is around 10 billion
dollars [2]. Some other indirect costs such as the failures of communications,
natural gas, transportation, water supply and social disruptions are also caused.
The influences of large blackouts in the Unites States with more than 50,000
customers or 300 MW load loss are analyzed based on the data sets obtained
from North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). It is summarized in
Table 1-1.
From Table 1-1, the main reasons of the large blackouts are either
extreme natural events (hurricanes, ice storms, etc.) or cascading outages. Table
1.2 gives descriptive statistics for these data with and without the smaller events.
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Table 1-1. The 15 Largest North American Blackouts and Their Causes, 1984-2006.
Date
1

14-Aug-2003

2
3

13-Mar-1989
18-Apr-1988

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

10-Aug-1996
18-Sep-2003
23-Oct-2005
27-Sep-1985
29-Aug-2005
29-Feb-1984
4-Dec-2002
10-Oct-1993
14-Dec-2002
4-Sep-2004
25-Sep-2004
14-Sep-1999

Location
Eastern U.S.,
Canada
Quebec, New York
Eastern U.S.,
Canada
Western U.S.
Southeastern U.S.
Southeastern U.S.
Southeastern U.S.
Southeastern U.S.
Western U.S.
Southeastern U.S.
Western U.S.
Western U.S.
Southeastern U.S.
Southeastern U.S.
Southeastern U.S.

MW

Customers

Primary cause

57,669

15,330,850

Cascading outage

19,400
18,500

5,828,000
2,800,000

Solar flare, cascade
Ice storm

12,500
10,067
10,000
9,956
9,652
7,901
7,200
7,130
6,990
6,018
6,000
5,525

7,500,000
2,590,000
3,200,000
2,991,139
1,091,057
3,159,559
1,140,000
2,142,000
2,100,000
1,807,881
1,700,000
1,660,000

Cascading outage
Hurricane Isabel
Hurricane Wilma
Hurricane Gloria
Hurricane Katrina
Cascading outage
Ice/wind/rain storm
Cascading outage
Winter storm
Hurricane Frances
Hurricane Jeanne
Hurricane Floyd

Table 1-2. Descriptive Statistics for the NERC Disturbance Data, 1984–2006.

Total number of events
Number of blackouts
Number after filling
missing data
Number after adjusting
for growth
Mean size in MW
Median size in MW
Standard deviation in
MW
Mean size in customers
Median size in
customers
Standard deviation in
customers

278
258
307

≥50k
customers
321
304
382

≥300 MW or
≥50k customers
438
406
419

547

317

373

413

524
86
2396

1508
634
4034

947
300
3648

987
385
3285

164,483
1323

321,984
85,228

430,585
149,500

317,372
94,643

689,815

1,106,958

1,075,888

939,638

All events
≥0 customers/MW
856
547
547

≥300 MW
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From the reports of those blackouts [1], [2], and [3], cascading outage is a
key factor leading to a large blackout. According to NERC, a cascading outage is
“the uncontrolled successive loss of system elements triggered by an incident at
any location [4]-[7].” Actually, sometimes the cascading outage is initiated by
more than one disturbance. Some cascading outages may stop before they bring
large influence to the system, while some of them bring disastrous results.
According to N-1 or N-2 criterion, electric power systems are generally designed
withstand single or double failure without causing the violation of any operating
limit. Nevertheless, other possible outages, such as human errors or hidden
failures in protection relays may enlarge the propagation of outages and lead to a
cascading outage finally. Generally speaking, the component outages will cause
the redistribution of the power flow and then cause the overload of other
components even dynamic instability problems.
Cascading outage involves a large amount of complex mechanisms,
which makes it more difficult to understand cascading outage fully. This
subsection gives an overview on cascading outage from different perspectives
and highlights its challenge for the analysis and modeling of cascading outages.
1.1.1 Major Causes of Cascading Outages
Basically, the causes for cascading outages can be divided into four
categories [8]:


Nature disasters: Fire, lighting, wind/rain, ice storm, hurricane, Tornado,
earthquake.



Human activity: Operator error or inappropriate actions, or fail to take
actions, inappropriate setting for protection devices, intentional attack.



Unexpected component failure: Equipment failure or hidden failure.



System failures: Distance relays trigger the transmission line due to
overcurrent or under-voltage, voltage collapse, abnormal excitation in
generators, abnormal speed in generators, generators tripped by under-
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frequency, generators tripped by under-voltage, generator tripped by
out-of-step, insufficient reactive power support, small signal instability.
The first three categories are common outages that initiate the events,
whereas the fourth category is failures that commonly enlarge the cascading. It is
almost impossible to prevent the happen of the outages in the first and second
categories with modern technology. However, most cascading outage blackouts
involve the dependent outages in the third and fourth categories.
1.1.2 Procedure of Cascading Outages
According to [9], basically, the procedure of cascading outage can be
divided into two phases, which are remarked by slow phase and fast phase.
For the slow cascade phase, the outages propagate slowly and have little
influence on the stability of power system. The time interval for this phase ranges
from several minutes up to several hours. Most outages in this phase are
belonging to common problems and the operators cannot identify them easily.
Thus the operators miss the chance to prevent the propagation of outages.
Besides, some hidden failures may be exposed during this phase, which trigger
some transmission lines and components [10].
During the fast cascade phase, power system becomes unstable. With the
redistribution of power flow, the overloaded transmission components are
triggered in a short time, they may cause voltage collapse, frequency collapse,
and oscillations. Meanwhile, the dynamic instability may trip the generators,
which lead to further load and generation imbalance and exaggerate the dynamic
instability. It is almost impossible for systems operators to stop the propagation of
the cascading during this phase manually. The time interval for this phase ranges
milliseconds to tens of seconds [9]. Generally, the overloaded components such
as transmission lines can still work for several hours under over-load conditions,
and they can be reclosed if no other fault is found. However, when a large power
swing happens in power system, the settings of distance relay of zone 2 or zone
3 may trip the transmission line with short time delay, and they will be acting so
quickly that the system operator has no time to respond and reclose the line or
4

stop the cascading. Thus, the cascading starts tripping like a domino and
eventually cause a large blackout.
Cascading phenomena are complicated because of the diversity of
failures and the many different mechanisms by which failures can interact. There
are

varying

modeling

requirements

and

timescales

(milliseconds

for

electromechanical effects and tens of minutes for voltage support and thermal
heating). Combinations of several of types of failures and interactions can
typically occur in large blackouts, including cascading overloads, failures of
protection equipment, transient instability, forced or unforced initiating outages,
reactive power problems and voltage collapse, software, communication, and
operational errors. Therefore it is very difficult to analyze it through conventional
power system analysis approaches and models. Many models and approaches
have been proposed to try to consider those mechanisms [11-94]. Some models
and approaches are utilizing complex network theory to investigate the
relationship between the propagation of cascading outages and topological
structure. Some are using stochastic approaches to consider the uncertainties in
a cascading outage. Some are modeling dynamics of system to involve machine,
voltage and frequency issues. High-level statistical models have also been
proposed to estimate the average cascading outage propagation and blackout
distribution sizes, which can provide useful suggestions for power system longterm planning. Interdependent infrastructures are modeled to analyze the
interactions between power grids and cyber networks and study the propagation
of cascading outage between different networks.

1.2

Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis of Cascading Outages
A large amount of models and approaches has been proposed in order to

model, simulate, and analyze the cascading outages [11-94]. However, no
existing model or approach can capture all the mechanisms during the cascading
outage. Each model or approach can only focus on one or several aspects, while
the information of the overall phenomenon is still needed in the simulation. In this
5

subsection, a brief review and summary of the state-of-art cascading outage
analysis models and methodologies will be presented. According to their different
perspectives and characteristics, those models and approaches can be divided
into six categories:


High-level statistic approaches



Stochastic simulation approaches



Quasi-dynamic and dynamic simulation approaches



Network theory approaches



Interdependent approaches



Other approaches

Note that each model or approach may have characteristics which are
involved in other categories. The classification in this thesis is based on its main
feature and characteristic. This is just a rough classification and there are other
classifications.
1.2.1 High-Level Statistic Approaches
This type of approaches investigated the process of cascading outage
without considering the physics of power systems. For example, they may
neglect the structure of power systems, times between different outages, and the
diversity of power system components and interactions. They are very useful to
understand cascading outage in more detailed models.
1) CASCADE Models
CASCADE model is an analytically tractable model based on load of the
component [11]. It assumes a random initial load on all identical components and
a given disturbance load on each component to initiate cascading. Some
components may fail when load exceeds a certain threshold, where the load of
other components will be redistributed, thus forming a cascading process. The
cascading only stops when no overloaded component exists or the whole system
fails. The redistributed formulas are much simpler when compared with detailed
models that simulate detailed cascading failure mechanisms such as power
6

flows. It is easier to obtain the total number of component outages as well as the
probability distribution of the blackout sizes. The model shows how system
loading affects the risk of a cascading failure [12]. When there is low load level,
the tail part of component failures is approximately exponential. The probability of
a large cascading outage is also low. However, when a critical loading level is
exceed, the distribution of the component outages follows the power law and the
risk of a large blackout increases significantly. This model is good for
understanding the general property of cascading outages but it ignores all
physical properties of power systems.
The above model is modified further and applied to analyze several
factors related to cascading outages. The cascading motor stall has been
analyzed with the CASCADE model in [13]. Reference [14] showed a high risk on
voltage collapse when a failure triggered a cascade of motor stalling. [15] has
analyzed the power system reliability by using a modified CASCADE model, the
time of outage propagation is also considered in [15].
2) Branching Process Models
Branching process model can be regarded as an improved CASCADE
model and it is widely used in the theory of probability [16]. This model has been
used in many areas such as Y chromosome transmission in genetics
disappearance of surnames in genealogy. [17] first introduced this model to the
analysis of cascading outages. Based on them, some improvements have been
made in [18-20], they mentioned the importance for applying the branching
process models. More recently, some new applications based on such models
can be found in [21], and [22].
Each individual component outage affects the outages in the next stages
interdependently according to a given distribution in the branching process
model. The results in [23] have shown that the probability distribution of outages
from a branching process can match with the simulated CASCADE model as well
as the historical data. The computation speed to estimate the propagation and
distribution of the size of blackout is faster by using the branching process model.
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[24] has investigated the influence of topology on the average propagation of
cascading outages in power system with this model. A novel and systematic
approach to discretize the data of load shed has been introduced by [25] and the
Galton-Watson branching process with a Poisson offspring distribution can be
used. Further, a multi-type branching process [26] has been applied to analyze
the statistics and interdependencies of cascading outages. The probability
distribution of load shed, the isolated buses and their conditional largest possible
total outages can be predicted by this model. This model needs few samples of
cascading outages to realize relatively accurate estimation but the disadvantage
of this model is that it lacks detailed mechanisms of the cascading outages in
power systems. It can only estimate the blackout size distribution of cascading
outage. From the perspective of operation, real time prediction and mitigation of
cascading outages cannot be realized with this model.
3) Interaction Model
Reference [27] proposes a power system’s interaction model that is
constructed based on a database of cascades from either historical events or
simulations. That interaction model extracts key information on cascading
outages of the power system, quantifying how interactions between component
failures influence the risk of cascading outages and capturing general
propagation patterns of cascades. Thus, scenarios of cascading outages can be
simulated and analyzed quickly and effectively in a time-intensive environment
only using that interaction model for prediction of their propagations and
mitigation actions without need to conduct time-consuming simulation of the
original power system model. Thus, the interaction model if available for a power
system can readily fit into real-time operation for operators’ situational awareness
and decision support.
1.2.2 Stochastic Simulation Approaches
A cascading outage can be described by a sequence of deterministic and
stochastic events. For example, based on simulations, the features of cascading
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outages can be reproduced basically if we tune the parameters affecting the
simulation for well-studied power systems. However, it is another matter entirely
to be able to predict or simulate the events of a cascading outage before it
happens. However, cascading outage will rarely proceed as you expect. Due to
the large uncertainties that initiate and exacerbate the cascading, the stochastic
simulation, also known as probabilistic simulation is necessary since it can try to
consider all possible factors. Moreover, some factors such as the misoperation
because of human error and transmission lines that contact over grown trees due
to relatively high current flow are very hard to be modeled in the simulation. It is
thus essential to use stochastic approaches to simulate more possible events.
1) Markov Chain Models
A Markov chain is a type of stochastic process used to describe a system
that follows a chain of linked events [28]. It is utilized to model the stochastic
factors in cascading outage of a power grid, such as hidden failure or
misoperations. The result of this model can be used as an evaluation of overall
probabilities of all states that depicts the cascading outage. The model can
normally have a large size.
In reference [29], a stochastic Markov chain model has been introduced.
The model was based on power flow redistribution. It took into account the
uncertainties in the load setting, generation and line flows. The model also
captured the cascading events with regard to real time signals. The critical
components have been identified using the metrics provided. Reference [30]
presented a network-based Markov chain model to study the propagation
dynamics of the entire power networks. Robustness of the power network has
been analyzed through the model. An extended Gillespie method was adopted in
the model [31]. It also showed that small-world network structure would
propagate cascading outage more widely and rapidly compared with a regular
power network. A Markovian tree-based multi-timescale cascading outage
simulation model has been provided in [32], aiming at risk assessment of
cascading outage. The paper also proposed a novel forward-backward
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Markovian tree search scheme based on a risk estimation index. In [33], the
author introduced a continuous-time Markov chain approach modeling the
system dynamics. The model considered loading level, error in transmissioncapacity estimation, and constraints in performing load shedding. It also allowed
real-time prediction of blackout evolution probability. Recently, an influenced
graph model using Markovian chain was described in [34]. Large amounts of
data from cascading outage simulations were synthesized into a Markovian
network model. The distribution of the cascading outage results achieved from
this model matched those from cascading outage simulators. A methodology
based on this model has been demonstrated to identify the probability of risk
when a component was upgraded in the power system.
2) PRACTICE Models
A useful stochastic simulation approach of cascading outages has been
proposed in [35]. In this model, “single-path” mode and “multi-path” mode are
used. Single-path mode allows uncertainties only relevant to the initial events,
after which the system will behave “as expected” during the cascading. Multi-path
mode can simulate uncertainties and the response from protection systems,
through the whole procedure during the cascading. The hidden failure
probabilistic model, the overcurrent relay probabilistic model and the event treebased probabilistic cascading approaches was adopted in the techniques. The
model was tested on Italian EHV transmission grid and a comparison was made
with a detailed overload-based dynamic time domain simulator. It showed that
the results obtained from the model and the dynamic time domain simulator can
match well with each other at least for the slow cascade phase [36].
1.2.3 Quasi-Dynamic and Dynamic Simulation Approaches
Dynamic simulation approaches are similar to conventional methodologies
that focus on power system dynamic characteristic analysis, while the difference
is that conventional methodologies are hard to simulate interactions under multicontingency cases during the cascading outage. New dynamic simulation models
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perform well on capturing some specific system dynamics during the cascading.
In addition, most mechanisms can be included in dynamic simulation models
under a variety of outages so that a relatively accurate prediction can be made.
However, due to the large amount of details to be taken into consideration, the
computation speed will be challenging. Right now, such models will mainly
contribute to deeply understanding the cascading outage mechanisms rather
than real time prediction and analysis for industrial utilization.
1) OPA Models
The researchers from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Power
System Engineering Research Center of Wisconsin University (PSerc) and
Alaska University (Alaska) proposed this ORNL-PSerc-Alaska (OPA) model [37].
It is DC power flow-based model. This model contains two parts: fast dynamic
process and slow dynamic process. Slow dynamic process is utilized to simulate
the evolution of power gird such as generation growth, load growth and
transmission capacity limits upgrade. The fast dynamic process is often used to
simulate outages and cascading overloading. In this model, a re-dispatch model
DC-OPF based on linear programing is used to adjust the generation and load.
The cost function has been taken into consideration to avoid unnecessary load
shedding. This model described a simplified dynamic process of cascading
outages and can be used to investigate the self-organization of power systems.
This OPA model was validated on a 1553-bus WECC network and the simulation
results were compared with historical WECC data with an acceptable
approximation [38]. The disadvantage of this model is that it cannot provide an
accurate simulation on real outages of power systems and it only focus on the
limited parts of cascading outages such as overloading.
An improved OPA model [39] has been proposed to improve the
limitations found in the original model. This improved OPA model has considered
more important factors such as dispatching, communication, protection relay,
planning, and operation mode. Two indices have been proposed to quantify the
cascading outage risk from the perspective of statistics, i.e. Value at Risk (VaR)
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and Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR). Then this model was validated on the
Northeast Power Grid in China.
Another AC OPA model has been proposed by [40]. This model contains
two dynamic processes: fast dynamics and slow dynamics. Fast dynamics
involve series blackouts. Slow dynamics can reflect the time evolution of power
systems. This novel AC OPA model can be used to analyze the voltage stability
of power systems and it is tested on the IEEE 118-bus power system and the
results showed that the ratio of total load to system transmission capacity can
explain SOC of power systems. This model has been modified in [41] further and
considered slow process such as tree contact and line outages due to line
heating into the simulation of cascading outages. Utility vegetation management
was also considered in this model.
2) Multi-Timescale Quasi-Dynamic Model
The multi-timescale quasi-dynamic model has been proposed in [42]. This
model enabled the consideration of different timescales involved in the process
of cascading outages which cannot be simulated by the existing approaches. The
simulation of cascading outages with representation of time evolution can be
realized. Three categories of timescales: short-term scale, mid-term scale, and
long-term scale are modeled. Meanwhile, this model can consider some
dynamics such as load variation and generation excitation protection. An
improved re-dispatch model has been proposed because that transmission
loading relief (TLR) and re-dispatch normally took 10–30 min [43]. The above
improvements enabled more accurate simulation of cascading outages. This
model was tested on IEEE 30-bus power system to study the role of generation
protection. The model was also demonstrated on a reduced 410-bus US-Canada
northeast power grid. The results showed that the simulated event can match
well with the blackout event happened in 2003.
3) Manchester Model
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Manchester model was proposed by the University of Manchester [44]. It
is based on AC power flow. A wide variety of mechanisms related to cascading
outages such as hidden failures, generator instability, under-frequency load
shedding (UFLS), emergency load shedding and re-dispatch of active and
reactive power were considered in this model. Monte Cardo simulation was used
for the risk of assessment of cascading outages with this model. Other research
[45-47] extended the Manchester model to study the mitigation strategies for
cascading outages and assess the cost of blackout.
4) TRELSS Model
Transmission Reliability Evaluation of Large Scale Systems (TRELSS) is
another commercial platform for the simulation and analysis of cascading
outages [48]. It is developed by EPRI and Southern Company Services. This
model can simulate the cascading outage as a sequence of quasi-steady state
system conditions based on AC power flow which are triggered by the tripping
outages. The actions of breakers have been modeled by the Protection and
Control Group (PCG). The model was tested on Western Interconnection power
system [49] to identify the most severe initial outages.
5) ASSESS Model
ASSESS is developed by Reseau de Transport d’Electricite (RTE) in
France and it is a commercial platform for the simulation and analysis of
cascading outages [50]. This platform is quite flexible for letting many
uncertainties to be considered. Four blocks have been provided by this model
such as quasi-steady state simulator that could model dynamics of systems [51],
security-constrained AC optimal power flow [52], time-domain simulator that
could model many control actions such as governors and zone 3 protection relay
[53], and the access to some tools for the statistical analysis of samples of
cascading outages. ASSESS provided a wide range of models including
sequences of events, protection settings, line ratings, fault clearance time, etc.
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The disadvantage of this model is that it requires a large amount of data and the
computation speed is still challenge with this platform.
6) Dynamic PRA Model
A two-level dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model was
introduced in [9]. The proposed model divided the process of cascading outage
into two phases and two different models were used in the two phases. The
influences some factors such as variation of cross-border power flows,
maintenance and shut-down of power plants, and the penetration of wind power
on cascading outages were investigated. This model was tested on New England
Test System (NETS) and New York Power System (NYPS) 69-bus test system. It
was found from the results that the thermal effects can contribute to cascading
outages.
An improved PRA model was introduced in [54] further. Two
decomposition models were used to analyze the fast phase and slow phase of
cascading outages, respectively. The frequency and the influence of severe
cases can be estimated with this model. The scenarios can be classified with a
clustering method so that the dynamic analysis was manageable from a
computational perspective. The dynamic models of generators were considered
in [55].
7) COSMIC Model
A novel nonlinear dynamic model for the simulation of cascading outages
has been proposed in [56]. It is called Cascading Outage Simulator with
Multiprocess Integration Capabilities (COSMIC). COSMIC was able to simulate
power system with a set of hybrid discrete and continuous differential algebraic
equations, as well as protection systems and machine dynamics. The model
involved a wide variety of mechanisms including rotating machines, exciters,
governors, power flows using nonlinear power flow equations, load voltage
responses, discrete changes (e.g. components failure and load shedding) and
etc. COSMIC used a recursive process to compute the differential algebraic
14

equations, which represented various mechanisms. Four kinds of loads, i.e.
constant power (P), constant current (I), constant impedance (Z), exponential (E),
or any combination of them (ZIPE) have been modeled [57]. The results obtained
from COSMIC model were compared with that from PowerWorld on IEEE 9-bus
power system [58]. Another simulation has been made and the results were
compared with a simple dc power-flow QSS model. The cascading processes
had good consistency during the early stage between two models, while the
simulation was substantially different during later stages.
1.2.4 Complex Network Theory Approaches
Many literature and researches focus on the propagation of cascading
outage in complex networks that is partially inspired by the propagation of
failures and congestion in Internets [59], [60], [61]. From the statistically results, it
is found that power girds have the characteristics of power laws and criticality,
which suggests the strong connection between the statistical characteristics of
the topology of the network and the dynamics of cascading. The models consider
flows of discrete packets that are injected and removed from all nodes and
transfer the packets along the shortest distance paths between any two nodes.
The criticality of links or nodes can be quantified by the concept of
“betweenness”. It is proportional to the number of shortest distance paths
through the link or node. Based on complex network theory, these models
abstract the power grid as undirected network or directed network which is
consisting with vertexes and edges to study the statistical characteristics of
power grids. These models are very different from the power system models.
Cascading phase transitions and the vulnerability of network have been studied
in [62], [63], and [64]. It was found that the typical power girds are small-world
networks in [65]. Later, some researches have studies power grids based on
complex network theory by considering more properties and characteristics of
power girds. By considering the electrical distances in power systems, it was
found that the power systems have a scale free structure [66]. Topological graph
concept has been proposed that was more consistent with the patterns of power
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system generation and load [67]. An “influence model” has been introduced in
[68]. It is a tree network that representing the influences between idealized
components abstractly. Components can be failed or operational according to a
Markov model that represents both internal component failure and repair
processes and influences between components that cause failure propagation. A
Markov model has been proposed for nodal components in [69], it was found that
the outages can propagate along the transmission lines of power networks with a
fixed probability.
1.2.5 Interdependent Approaches
Analysis of interdependent networks has been done for many years in
various areas [70]. With the increased coupling between power grid and cyber or
communication network, the risk between the interdependent networks also
increases. The possible outages of control systems connecting to the cyber
networks such as SCADA can contribute to the propagation of cascading
outages between interdependent networks. At the same time, cyber attack is
happening frequently in the environment of smart grid [71]. The typical event
happened in Ukraine in 2015 [72]. The attack on the cyber network caused the
SCADA distribution management system to be controlled remotely and some
substations were disconnected for several hours. This attack brought much
influence to many areas in Ukraine. With the coupling between power grid and
cyber network, one outage in cyber network may propagate to power grid and
cause the devices and equipment in power grid to be out of function. Risk
assessment for interdependent networks has been studies in some researches
[73-77]. It is still a big challenge since many mechanisms are involved from
power grid and cyber network.
1) Complex Network-Based Interdependent Models
In real world, there are many interdependent infrastructures. We are
familiar with some of them such as economic, transportation, and Internet
networks. Complex network theory has been widely used in the study of these
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areas [78-79]. The coupling between power grid and cyber network has caused
much attention [80]. Some researchers begin to investigate the interdependence
between power grid and cyber network with complex network theory.
An interdependent model has been introduced in [81], which was used for
the analysis of robustness of interdependent networks with the propagation of
cascading outages. This model was tested on a power grid and an Internet
network involved in Italy blackout happened in 2003. The results showed that by
removing a set of critical nodes, the cascading outage would be triggered in the
two interdependent networks and caused a complete fragmentation finally. An
analytic solution can be obtained with this model. An improved interdependent
model was proposed in [82], it was used to analyze the robustness of power gird
with random multiple support-dependence relations. The test results showed that
the similar conclusion can be obtained from the interdependent networks when
compared with that from the single networks. An interdependent model was
introduced in [83], it was used for designing some strategies to mitigate the
propagation of cascading outages in interdependent networks. The model was
tested on a power grid and an Internet network involved in Italy blackout
happened in 2003. It was found that the cascading outage in interdependent
networks can be suppressed by selecting a small number of autonomous nodes.
The above models are useful to study the general and overview property of
interdependent networks but they fail to consider properties of power gird such
as Kirchhoff laws. Some electrical properties have been considered in the
coupling model proposed in [84], and the model considered power grid and the
supporting Control and Communication Network (CCN). For power gird,
substation and generator were considered. For CCN, the router was considered.
The minimum number of nodes from both networks was calculated whose fail
can totally destroy the interdependent networks. A new interdependent model
was proposed to involve there networks, i.e. power grid, communication network,
and interdependency network [85]. A sensitivity analysis was performed to
evaluate the mitigating method in the model. More recently, a more
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comprehensive model has been proposed in [86]. The model used a mesh
network that considered power system characteristics. Moreover, bidirectional
links including data uploading and command downloading channels were
modeled. These links were supposed to connect all cyber network nodes as well
as a corresponding physical node in power grids. The fragility of the coupling
model has been studied under various cyber-attacks, such as denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks, replay attacks and false data injection attacks. Load shedding and
relay protection have been involved in the model.
2) Flocking-Based Hierarchical Cyber-Physical Models
A hierarchical cyber-physical multi-agent model of smart grid based on
flocking theory has been presented in [87-88]. The model considered dynamic
nodes (generators in this model), PMU and local cyber-controller. The frequency,
phase angle and other related parameters were involved in the generators which
were regarded as physical parts. PMU and local cyber-controller served as cyber
elements. The model concentrated on control strategies for robustness and
resilience of a coupling system. The potential performance improvement has
been tested using New England 39-bus power system with various faults and
communication delays.
3) Inter-Dependent Markov Chain Models
A probabilistic cascading outage analysis framework was provided by the
Inter-Dependent Markov Chain (IDMC) model to study the effects of
interdependencies among power grid and physical networks. The IDMC was
introduced by [89] and it demonstrated that interdependencies between two
systems can affect each other on distribution sizes of outages significantly. The
results also showed that systems with exponentially distributed outages sizes
tend to be less robust as evidenced by the power-law distributed outage sizes for
the two networks. It assumed that the communication network was more
vulnerable when an outage occurred, which would increase the probability of
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outage in power grid. It was also found that when power system components
failed, it may trigger cyber networks as well with a given probability.
1.2.6

Other Approaches

1) Potential Cascading Models
Physical and Operational Margins (POM) is based on AC power flow. The
Potential Cascading Models (PCM) is an integrated function of POM [90]. With
the initial events, the following events can be simulated with this model. For
selecting the initial events, cluster approach was used to select the N-1 or N-2
contingencies. This model was tested on US 2007 Eastern Interconnection
model with summer peak load. The previous manually analysis was consistent
with the result obtained. And some unidentified potentially cascading-initiating
possibilities were found. The model used the same data to test remedial actions
in [91]. The remedial actions such as active and reactive power dispatch, phaseshifter adjustment, and transformer tap change, emergency load shedding, line
switching, and reactor and capacitor switching were applied at each stage during
the process of cascading outage until the propagation of cascading outage has
been fully mitigated [92]. It showed that all identified potential cascading outage
can be stopped using the proposed remedial actions.
2) Historical Data-Based Models
The main purpose of historical data-based models was to reproduce the
history blackout events with accurate approximation. The models can be
modified if there is obvious mismatch between the real disturbance data and
reproduced results. This model would be very helpful for deeply understanding
the blackout and cascading outages. An event was simulated and reproduced by
using Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) ETMSP models [93]. The tested
event happened on August 10, 1996, the location is in western North America.
Around 7.49 million people were affected with loss of 30,390 MW of load. In this
study, the standard WSCC dynamic data was used to reproduce the simulation
result for this event, however, the result was far away from the real data. Some
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modifications were made on the data and models and then the simulation results
could match well with the real data. Many factors that contribute to cascading
outages need to be considered in the simulation and analysis of cascading
outages. However, historical data-based models may not be the best models to
analyze the cascading outage.
3) Hidden Failure Models
Hidden Failure model has been proposed in [94] and hidden failure plays
important role to the propagation of cascading outages. With the propagation of
outages, there will be overloaded line in the power system and the lines
connecting to the overloaded line are exposed to the unexpected tripping.
Generally, hidden failure model is based on DC power flow. The influences of
critical factors such as hidden failure probability function, spinning reserve
capacity, system load level, and power flow distribution were investigated. Critical
protection relays in the power system can be identified by fast simulation and
random search. The model was tested on WSCC 179-bus power system with
mitigation approaches and risk assessments being studied.
The comparisons between different models and approaches are
summarized by Table 1-3 [95].
Table 1-3. Comparison of the Models and Approaches of Cascading Outages.
Models
CASCADE
Models
High-Level
Statistic
Approaches

Branching
Process Models
Interaction
Model

Stochastic
Simulation
Approaches

PRACTICE
Models
Markov Chain
Models

Advantages
Failure probability is related to load level.
Can be regarded as an improved
CASCADE model.
Consider each failure component from
early
stages
a given
distribution.
Quantify
howthrough
interactions
between
component failures.
Probabilistic method to generate new
samples of cascading outages.
“Single-path” mode and “multi-path”
mode introduced.
Event-tree-based approach adopted.
Non-locally propagation illustrated.
Enable quantitative risk assessment.
Simple and tractable.
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Disadvantages

Ignores all
details of
cascading.

Fail to consider
dynamic
instability and
cascading
details.

Table 1-3. Continued.
Models

OPA Models

Quasi-Dynamic
and Dynamic
Simulation
Approaches

Multi-timescale
Quasi-Dynamic
Model
Manchester
Models
TRELSS Model

ASSESS Model

Dynamic PRA
Model

Advantages
Take into consideration the effects of
dispatching, automation, communication,
relay protection, operation mode and
planning.
Tree contact, failure of lines due to line
heating, and UVM modeled.
Employ quasi-dynamic approach.
Approximate time evolution considered.
Improved re-dispatch simulation.
AC power flow adopted.
Monte Carlo methods are applied to risk
assessment.
Take into account actions of breakers.
Voltage problems modeled using quasisteady state AC power flow.
Security-constrained AC optimal power
flow provided.
Using quasi-steady state simulator to
model dynamics of system.
Modeling controls in system through full
time-domain simulator.
Two levels of cascading outage
simulated using two different models.

COSMIC Model

Consider non-linear dynamic
mechanisms.
Various load and relay modeled.

Complex
Network Theory
Approaches

Topological
Models

Quickly discover the unexpected
emergence of collective behavior.
Interdependencies depicted.
Computer and cyber risks considered.

Interdependent
Approaches

Complex
Network-Based
Interdependent
Models
Flocking-Based
Hierarchical
Cyber-Physical
Models
Inter-Dependent
Markov Chain
Models

Other
Approaches

Potential
Cascading
Models
Historical DataBased Models
Hidden Failure
Models

Frequency, phase angle, and other
related parameters involved.
Control strategies provided.
Enable a system-level prediction with
tractable details of the system.
Dynamic nodes, PMU and local cybercontroller modeled.
“Cluster” approach employed.
Aim at predicting potential cascading
outages.
Accurately reproduce history events.
Complementary to existing models.
Hidden Failure and generator re-dispatch
considered.
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Disadvantages

Slow
simulation.
Detailed power
system data
required.

Lack of
electrical
features of
power systems.

Difficult to
validate.
Detailed
mechanisms
ignored.

Focus only part
of cascading
outage
mechanisms.

1.3

Contributions of this Work
The main challenges for the modeling, simulation and analysis of

cascading outages are:
1) The detailed process of cascading outages in a power system cannot
be captured accurately by existing steady-state approaches due to ignoring
dynamics under outages and control actions. Although dynamic simulation can
provide more detailed dynamic information but its major drawback is intense time
consumption for large system models. Also, existing power system models are
not validated well for mid-term or long-term power system simulations over an
extended time period of tens of minutes to several hours, which, however, are
the typical time spans for the whole process of cascading outages. Thus, power
flow based steady-state or quasi-dynamic simulation models are acceptable for
representing the cascading process at least for the early stage of cascading
outages since transient behaviors of a power system fade away and system
often reaches its steady state quickly. Therefore this thesis focuses on the
development of steady-state approaches for the modeling, simulation, and
analysis of cascading outages that are able to provide important insights on
dynamic behaviors of the system under outages and control. The existing steadystate approaches for cascading outages are mainly for offline analysis. This
thesis will target at online simulation and analysis of cascading outages for
proactive mitigation control against a power blackout.
2) Frequency is an important indicator of the real-time balance between
active powers of the generation and load in a power system, especially during
cascading outages. Abnormal frequency may trigger under-frequency load
shedding (UFLS) and generator frequency protection, causing a large amount of
loss in generation and load, so it is a significant contributing factor of cascading
outages and blackouts. However, frequency is seldom considered yet in existing
steady-state approaches for the simulation and analysis of cascading outages.
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This thesis introduces the system frequency deviation into the power flow model
so that frequency-related outages and control actions can be simulated.
3) Various remedial and emergency actions, including load and generator
tripping, excitation controls, and intentional islanding, are deployed to prevent
cascading blackouts. The intentional or active islanding method is a good way for
mitigation of cascading outages. The computational efficiency of these methods
is the remaining challenge.
The main focus of this thesis is for the three challenges mentioned above.
The contributions of this thesis are summarized by:
1) The framework of a multi-layer interaction graph is proposed for the
monitoring and mitigation of cascading outages. This multi-layer interaction graph
can be constructed offline based on a large number of samples of cascades with
detailed stated-state models. It can be used online for monitoring and mitigating
cascading outages.
2) A novel steady-state approach for the simulation of cascading outages
is proposed considering frequency. By using this approach, the propagation of
cascading outages can be captured more accurately.
3)

An online strategy of critical component-based active islanding is

proposed that isolates outages within a designed area so as to reduce the
cascading outage risk of the system.
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CHAPTER TWO
MULTI-LAYER INTERACTION GRAPH FOR SIMULATION
AND ANALYSIS OF CASCADING OUTAGES
2.1

Introduction
The high computational complexity for simulation of cascading outages

cannot meet the requirements for online applications. Thus, an advisable
approach for online analysis and mitigation of cascading outages would be
utilization of a high-level model that is established offline directly from a
comprehensive database on historical or simulated cascading events. The
“influence model” which is a tree network is proposed to quantify the influences
between the components of network [68]. Similar to this general idea, [96]
quantifies the interactions between transmission lines by line interaction graph in
order to analyze cascading failures. Ref. [27] constructs an interaction network
from a database of cascade outages to capture key components and key links
between component outages that play critical roles in outage propagation. The
interaction network is useful for understanding the general patterns of outage
propagation and has potentials in online applications. Then this interaction
network can be combined with online monitoring and mitigation of cascading
outages. The valuable information extracted from the samples of cascading
outages includes the outage components involved, propagation paths of outages,
amounts of load shedding, geographic distances between two outages, etc.,
which if presented together can provide system operators with a comprehensive
picture on the propagation patterns of outages and take effective control actions.
This chapter first demonstrates the application of the interaction model
and interaction graph to a realistic Northeastern Power Coordinating Council
(NPCC) power system in Section 2.2 [97]. Then this chapter proposes a multilayer interaction graph [98] as the extension and generalization of the singlelayer interaction network in [27]. Different from that interaction network, this multi24

layer interaction graph integrates multiple layers that respectively identify the key
intra-layer links and components in each layer contributing the most to outage
propagation from various perspectives, e.g. the number of line outages, the
amount of load shedding and the electrical distance on outage propagation.
Besides, key inter-layer links that connect components from different layers are
also defined to model the transition from one type of consequences to another
type. All the key intra-layer links and components and key inter-layer links and
components together provide comprehensive information on the dominant
outage propagation patterns, based on which effective mitigation measures can
be further developed. Section 2.3 introduces the proposed multi-layer interaction
graph and the method for identifying key intra- and inter-layer links and
components. Section 2.4 proposes multiple strategies to mitigate the propagation
of cascading outages and validates the proposed multi-layer interaction graph.
Section 2.5 proposes a method to determine the minimum number of samples of
cascading outages needed for constructing a reliable multi-layer interaction
graph. Section 2.6 demonstrates the multi-layer interaction graph obtained from a
simulated database of cascading outages on a Northeastern Power Coordinating
Council (NPCC) 48-machine 140-bus system. Finally conclusions are drawn in
Section 2.7.

2.2

Demonstration of Interaction Graph and Interaction Model on

the NPCC Power System
2.2.1 Original Cascades and Simulated Cascades
In this chapter, “original cascades” are the cascading outage sequences
from utilities or generated by detailed cascading outage models while “simulated
cascades” are the cascading outages sequences produced directly by the
interaction model that is built from “original cascades”.
2.2.2 Interaction Matrix and Interaction Graph
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The interaction matrix B determines how components (e.g. lines) interact
with each other based on the original cascades. The nonzero element bij of B is
the empirical probability that the failure of component i triggers the failure of
component j. The interaction matrix can be represented by the interaction
network or graph  (C, L) , for which each link corresponds to one nonzero element
in B and represents that a failure of the source vertex component causes the
failure of the destination vertex component with nonzero probability. The vertex
set C represents all components of the system.
2.2.3 Identification of Key Links and Components
In [27] the link weight Il is defined to indicate the contribution of a link l to
the propagation of cascading outages. The link weight is actually the expected
value of the number of failures that are propagated through the link. Then, the set
of key links Lkey can be obtained by

Lkey  {l | Il   l Ilmax }
where  l >0 is a constant to identify the key links with large link weight, I

(2.1)
max
l

is the

largest link weight of all links.
The vertex out-strength of the interaction network indicating how much a
component i influences another is

Siout 



Il

(2.2)

lLout ( i )

where Lout(i) is the set of links starting from vertex i. The set of key components
Ckey which contribute mostly to the propagation of cascading outages can be
obtained by

C key  {i | Siout   s Siout ,max }

(2.3)

where  s >0 is a constant to identify key components with large out-strengths,
and S iout,max is the largest value of all components.
2.2.4 Interaction Model
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As in [27], an interaction model can be used to efficiently simulate
cascades based on the initial tripping probability of each component and the
interaction matrix B. All components are assumed to be initially operating and
each

component

fails

with

a

small

probability.

The

component

failures then cause other component failures independently according to the
empirical probability in interaction matrix B.
2.2.5 Mitigation Strategies of Cascading outages
Since key links contribute much to propagation of cascading outages,
which may be mitigated by weakening the corresponding element in interaction
matrix B. Thus, mitigation strategies may be suggested, e.g. blocking relays on
the destination vertices and even controlled islanding [99] to break some key
lines and isolate cascades. A random mitigation strategy means weakening
elements in B randomly while an intentional mitigation strategy chooses key links
in matrix B to weaken. Subsection 2.2.7 will investigate effectiveness of
mitigation strategies in reducing risks of cascading outages.
2.2.6

Determining The Line Flow Limits
In order to apply the interaction model to the NPCC test bed, we first

generate original cascades by using the fast dynamic process of AC-OPA model
for which reasonable line flow limits as important parameters are needed. In [40],
the line flow limits are determined by running the fast dynamics of OPA and the
slow dynamics of OPA on a base load level that together emulate a long-term
power system planning process to selectively upgrade lines in response to their
involvements in daily failures starting from initial guesses of the limits. Then the
line flow limits at an expected load level (either the base load level or a future
level) are determined by

LimitiDC  Limitik /  m

(2.4)

where LimitiDC represents the line flow limit of component i at the expected load
level, Limitik is the line flow limit of component i on the k-th simulation day, >1 is
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a constant, representing mean load daily growth factor, and mk. The line flow
limits to be determined are for the base load level if m=k, or a targeting future
load level if m<k. In this chapter, satisfaction to the N-1 criterion on each
simulation day is not required. However, the OPA algorithm can easily be
modified to consider the N-1 criterion. For example, [100] extended the OPA
simulation to address the N-1 criterion.
Fig. 2-1 describes an OPA-based method for obtaining the line flow limits.
The advantage of using DC-OPA is fast and easy to solve. However, such a DCOPA method when determining line flow limits does not consider the influence of
reactive power. In contrast, the fast dynamic process of AC- OPA to produce a
database of original cascades does consider reactive power and voltage
variations. That cause some limits from DC-OPA to be violated at high
probabilities for lines carrying heavy reactive power flows, e.g. those supporting
load center areas.

Figure 2-1. Flow chart of the DC-OPA method for line flow limits.

Here we have to mention that for a power system, if each bus has a high
power factor (>0.76 for the IEEE 118-bus system studied in [20] and [27]), the
impact of reactive power on violations of the line flow limits from the DC-OPA
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method during the fast dynamic process of AC-OPA is minor. In that case, the
limits from the DC-OPA method can directly be used. However, for the NPCC
test bed, there are a few load buses with very low power factors, e.g. buses 3, 92,
95 and 114 since in those areas, there are a few lines carrying heavy reactive
power flows to support voltage. The limits from the DC-OPA method will be
violated in the fast dynamic process of AC-OPA. Therefore, for some power
system like the NPCC test bed, we need to revise the line flow limits obtained by
DC-OPA based method using (2.5) to give considerations to the impact from
reactive power, where LimitiAC and LimitiDC are respectively a corrected line flow
limit and the limit obtained from the original DC-OPA method, and Qi is the
planned reactive power flow of component i at the expected load level, which
may approximately be estimated by, e.g., the reactive power flow at the base
load level multiplied by k-m if there is no better knowledge on it.

LimitiAC  ( LimitiDC )2  Qi2

(2.5)

Alternatively, an AC-OPA method may substitute AC OPF for DC OPF in
the procedure of Fig. 2-1 for more accurate limits addressing reactive power.
However, that will cause greatly increased computation burdens but the limits
obtained will have similar statistical properties with the limits obtained by the
aforementioned modified DC-OPA method.
2.2.7

Simulation Results

1) Determining Line Flow Limits for the NPCC Test Bed
The original NPCC 140-bus, 48-machine, 233-branch model comes from
the Power System Toolbox [101] and represents the backbone transmission of
the northeast region of the Eastern Interconnection, which was involved in the
2003 blackout event. The base load level of the model is 28GW. We use
constant P/Q load models. The first task is to obtain a set of reasonable line flow
limits for that base load level such that a test bed is developed for cascading
outages simulation.
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Figure 2-2. NPCC power system test bed.
Table 2-1. Information of Parameters.
Parameter
No. of days
λ
µ
γ
p0

DC-OPA AC-OPA
64000
10000
1.0005 1.005
1.67
1.67
0.0001 0.0001

Remark
Simulation days
Daily load and generation growth factor
Line improvement factor
Load variability
Probability of initial line outage

Figure 2-3. Simulation results of total line flow limits (the upper one is the total line flow limits for
the current load level, and the bottom one is the total line flow limits after converting to the basic
load level).
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The 2nd column of Table 2-1 gives main parameters of the original DCOPA method. Each initial line flow limit takes double of the base line flow. After a
set of line flow limits LimitiDC is obtained. The final line flow limits LimitiAC are
calculated from (2.5). Then, the test bed is simulated by an AC-OPA based fast
dynamic process to generate the original cascades, whose parameters are given
in the 3rd column.
Fig. 2-3 gives the total line flow limit from the original DC-OPA method.
From it, a conclusion is that the total line flow limit is stable after the number of
simulation days reaches 10000 when two strengths, the load growth to trigger
cascades and the line upgrading to reduce the risk of cascades, reach their
balance, i.e. the equilibrium of the slow dynamic process. We compared the
average variation of each line limit between two stages, i.e. the 10000-th day and
the 64000-th day. The variation is as small as 6.9% so that we may ignore the
fluctuation of the total line limit after the 10000-th day and adopt the set of line
flow limits on that day as the initial limits.
Table 2-2. Line Flow Limits for Original DC-OPA Method.
Line No.
4
5
223

MW and MVar flows
at base load level
3.99MW,43.83Mvar
5.07MW,45.91Mvar
51.44MW,163.09Mvar

Line flow limit
by DC-OPA
24.93MVA
24.17MVA
126.09MVA

Updated limit
50.42MVA
51.88MVA
206.15MVA

Reactive powers of lines 4, 5 and 223 are found larger than the line flow
limits from the original DC-OPA method. Table 2-2 gives those limits, their
updated values by using (2.5), and the real and reactive power flows of those
lines at the base load level for purpose. The updated line flow limits will be used
in simulation to create original cascades.
2) Building the Interaction Model
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Table 2-3. Key Links of NPCC Test Bed.
i → j
199 → 198
38 → 6
112 → 105
19 → 24
38 → 8
6 → 36
21 → 6
198 → 201

Line pairs
(126,125)→(126,124)
(33,32)→(4,1)
(81,78)→(75,76)
(13,12)→(15,14)
(33,32)→(5,31)
(4,1)→(31,30)
(14,13)→(4,1)
(126,124)→(127,126)

Il

198 → 204
198 → 225
112 → 197
38 → 42
38 → 40
18 → 24
24 → 29
19 → 21
105 → 215
19 → 23
38 → 7
32 → 31
114 → 166
197 → 198
162 → 163
6 → 35
197 → 203

(126,124)→(128,126)
(126,124)→(138,126)
(81,78)→(125,124)
(33,32)→(35,34)
(33,32)→(34,33)
(12,7)→(15,14)
(15,14)→(18,17)
(13,12)→(14,13)
(75,76)→(134,132)
(13,12)→(15,7)
(33,32)→(5,4)
(20,19)→(20,17)
(83,112)→(113,112)
(125,124)→(126,124)
(111,108)→(111,109)
(4,1)→(30,29)
(125,124)→(128,125)

1254.8
1253.2
1186.6
928.6
893.5
832.6
816.4
784.0
780.3
749.6
735.1
721.9
672.9
669.1
650.4
643.7
631.0

4156.7
3005.5
2041.7
1549.7
1377.1
1330.9
1278.2
1277.7

Table 2-4. Key Components of NPCC Test Bed.
Key component
38
6
199
112
105
198
19
24
166
21
8
18
197
215
35

Line
(33,32)
(4,1)
(126,125)
(81,78)
(75,76)
(126,124)
(13,12)
(15,14)
(113,112)
(14,13)
(5,31)
(12,7)
(125,124)
(134,132)
(30,29)
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Siout

8822.2
7339.7
5914.4
5586.7
4473.7
4097.9
3664.8
3302.1
2974.0
2610.3
1994.5
1892.9
1583.9
1580.8
1470.1

Following the algorithm of the interaction model, key links and
components that play important roles in the propagation of cascading outages
are identified. Those identified key links are actually line pairs in the NPCC test
bed, and their weights Il for the original cascades are listed in Table 2-3.
Complementary cumulative probability distribution of link weight of all links
is displayed in Fig. 2-4. Both  l and  s take 0.15. Key links only take 0.7% of all
links of the system but the sum of their weights cover 38.5% of the total weights
of all links. These very few links contribute quite a lot to the propagation of
cascading outages and together capture highly concentrated key information on
cascading outages of the NPCC test bed. The identified key components are
listed in Table 2-4. Failures of these components are the most involved ones in
cascades. System operators should pay more attentions to those components.
The number of key components is 15, i.e. 6.43% of all components for the
original cascades. However, the sum of the out-strengths of key components is
68.8% of that for all involved components.

Figure 2-4. Complementary cumulative probability distribution of link weight.
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Figure 2-5. Key links (red arrows), key components (green lines), and other involved components
(blue lines) with the rest of the system (faded).

Fig. 2-5 highlights the key links (red arrows), key components (green
lines) and other involved components (blue lines), which together determine the
areas that are most vulnerable to cascading outages. Actually, those areas
match very well the geographical locations of load center areas in the actual
NPCC system such as the Connecticut load center and New York City load
center. From those identified links and components, propagation paths of
cascading outages are indicated, e.g. the path (75, 76) → (134, 132), (13, 14) →
(4, 1) and (15, 14) → (18, 17). Observations from Fig. 2-5 on the propagation
paths are: first, the source and destination vertices of most key links, e.g. at an
earlier stage of a propagation path, are lines geographically close to each other,
which indicates that cascading outages often initiate from local problems;
second, however, at the later stage of a path, some key links may have source
and destination vertices far away from each other, which means that, at a later
stage, cascading outages develop to a wider-area or even system-wide problem.
The second observation indicates that the power system exhibits more nonlinear
“butterflyeffect” behaviors in a later stage of cascading outages, which are
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captured by the AC-OPA based fast dynamic process for creating the original
cascades and consequently can be captured by the interaction model. This
property is similar to the discussion in [27]. Those observations suggest that
mitigation strategies should be taken before cascading outages develop to a
system-wide problem.
3) Comparison between Original and Simulated Cascades

Figure 2-6. Probability distributions of the total number of line failed for original and simulated
cascades.

The probability distributions of the total number of line outages
respectively for original cascades and simulated cascades are shown in Fig. 2-6.
We simulate 20 times and obtain the average probability distribution and the
standard deviations (vertical axis) for the simulated cascades. It is found that
those two distributions basically match especially for bigger cascades (with >10
lines failed). The standard deviations for the simulated cascades are small. It
indicates that the interaction model authentically captures the statistical
properties of the original cascades.
4) Mitigation Strategies for Cascading Outages
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Figure 2-7. Probability distributions of the total number of line failed for original and simulated
cascades under different mitigation strategies.

Intentional mitigation strategies that block some relays suggested from the
interaction model are tested and compared with random relay blocking
strategies. From Fig. 2-7, the risk of large-scale cascades is greatly reduced with
the intentional strategies while that for the random strategies is not obvious,
which suggests the identified key links indeed play important roles in the
propagation of cascading outages.

2.3

Multi-Layer Interaction Graph
The schematic diagram of the multi-layer interaction graph is illustrated in

Fig. 2-8, which has three layers respectively in terms of the number of line
outages, the amount of load shedding and the electrical distance of outage
propagation. In each layer of Fig. 2-8, the key intra-layer links and components
for one power grid are highlighted respectively by thick arrows and lines. Note
that the number of key intra-layer links and components can vary based on
different selection thresholds, which will be discussed later.
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Figure 2-8. Schematic diagram on how a scenario of cascade outages propagates in and across
multiple layers of the interaction graph for the NPCC power system. (thick red arrows and green
lines are key intra-layer links and key intra-layer components; broken lines with arrows indicate
transitions between layers)

C1

l1

C2

l2

C3

l3

C4

l4

C5

Figure 2-9. Path of a sample scenario of cascade outages.
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Fig. 2-8 presents a simple scenario on the propagation of cascading
outages within and across layers. As shown in Fig. 2-9, the path of that scenario
involves five components C1, C2,..., and C5 connected by four directed intra-layer
links l1, l2, l3, and l4, which respectively belong to the first, second, third and
second layers. This entire process of cascading outages can only be observed
from the multi-layer interaction graph while any single-layer can only provide
partial information for the entire process. The multi-layer interaction graph
generated offline provides a big picture on propagation patterns of cascading
outages, which is valuable for the system operators to take effective control
actions.
In this section, three control strategies that weaken key intra-layer links
located in each layer are studied to mitigate cascading outages respectively from
three perspectives, i.e. the number of line outages, the amount of load shedding,
and the propagated electrical distance. Besides, integrated mitigation strategies
involving key intra-layer links from different layers can be applied.
2.3.1 Database of Cascades and Links
generation 2

genration 3

C11,1

C21,1

C31,1

C12,1

C22,1

C32,1

.
.
.

.
.
.

.
.
.

Load1,1

Load2,1

Load3,1

cascade 1

.
.
.

amount of
load shedding

.
.
.
.
.
.

component
outages

.
.
.

generation 1

.
.
.

cascade N
Figure 2-10. Schematic diagram of the cascades.

Typically, the transmission lines or transformers can be considered as
components. For simplicity, “cascade” in the rest of the chapter means one
sample of cascading outages, whose outages are clustered into multiple
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generations by time or sequence of outages. Each cascade starts with initial
component outages in generation 1 and continues to generate outages in the
following generations until there is no outage or the system collapses as
illustrated by Fig. 2-10. Here Cij,m is the j-th component outage in generation i of
the m-th cascade, and Loadi,j is the amount of load shedding at the i-th
generation of the m-th cascade.
Following the same structure as Fig. 2-10, a large number of independent
cascades triggered by different initial component outages comprise the database
of cascades. The component outages in one generation are considered to
happen almost at the same time, whose sequence can be ignored. Thus, some
causality between any two component outages respectively from two consecutive
generations is hypothesized. A component outage Cij,m may potentially be
caused by several component outages by going through all of the cascades,
among which the one occurring the most times in the database is assumed to be
the true cause of Cij,m in ref. [27]. Other links connecting the remaining
component outages and Cij,m are regarded as the redundant links. Finally, the set
of links is obtained and denoted by Ltotal.
2.3.2 Link Weights for Different Layers
Different link weights are defined for the three layers:


The link weight applied in the first layer is the empirical probability
(denoted by Pl) of the source component outage causing the
destination component outage [27].



The link weight in the second layer is the average amount of load
shedding (denoted by Wl) triggered by the link.



The link weight of the third layer is the electrical distance (denoted by
Zl) in terms of equivalent impedance between the source and
destination component outages.

1) Link Weight in Terms of the Number of Line Outages
The link weight is calculated by
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Pl 

Nl:i  j

(2.6)

Ni

where Nl:i  j is the number of occurrences for link l and Ni is the number of times
of outages of the source component i over the entire database.
2) Link Weight in Terms of the Amount of Load Shedding
In each cascade, the initial outages propagate to subsequent outages in
the following generations. For the m-th cascade in the database, the component
outages in generation g-1 can produce subsequent outages in generation g
resulting in Loadg,m of load shedding, which can be assigned to the links
connecting the component outages in generation g-1 and g. The average amount
of load shedding for link l in the m-th cascade is defined as

dlm 

Load g ,m

(2.7)

N ( g 1, g ),m

where Loadg,m represents the amount of load shedding at generation g of the mth cascade and N(g-1,g),m is the total number of links connecting generations g-1
and g. From all of the cascades which involve link l, the average amount of load
shedding caused by link l is defined as
Nl

Wl 

d
m 1

m
l

(2.8)
Nl
If the true causalities between consecutive generations are unknown, for
simplicity, we may assume that those N(g-1,g),m links connecting generations g-1
and g have the same amount of load shedding as shown by (2.7) and hence
have uniform weights in one cascade. An alternative method may adopt nonuniform link weights and calculate the link weight by
dlm:i  j 

Load g ,m
N ( g 1, g ),m

Fi

F

iC ( i )

(2.9)

i

where the source component i outage and destination component j outage are
respectively in generations g-1 and g. Fi is the power flow of component i before
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its outage and C(i) is the set of component outages at generation g-1. An
interpretation of (2.9) is that the links starting from source component i which
have large power flows before its outage will be assigned large link weights in
that cascade, which is reasonable since the outage of component i may cause
power flow redistribution of some heavily loaded lines nearby.
3) Link Weight in Terms of Propagated Electrical Distance
The NERC blackout report [2] shows that outages may propagate to next
outages either near or far in the network and become widespread in a later stage
of cascading outages. The statistical characterization of how cascading outages
typically spread on the network is analyzed in [21] based on standard utility data.
In this chapter, the links’ spatial spreading is quantified by the electrical distance
defined by [102-103], which originally quantifies the distance between two buses
in power systems. Here, we adapt it to quantify the electrical distance between
two components (i.e. lines) as

Zi (is ,id ) j ( js , jd )  min{Ziequ
, Ziequ
, Ziequ
, Ziequ
}
s js
s jd
d js
d jd
Zequ,   Z  2Z  Z   {is , id },  { js , jd }

(2.10)

Where Zi (is ,id ) j ( js , jd ) is the electrical distance for the link i→j with source
component i and destination component j, Z iequ
, Z iequ
, Z iequ
, and Z iequ
are four
s js
s jd
d js
d jd
equivalent impedances which each start from a bus of the source component and
end at a bus of the destination component as calculated by the above formula.
Z is the -th row -th column entry of the network impedance matrix, and Z
and Z are the -th and -th diagonal elements, respectively.
2.3.3 Construction of Multi-Layer Interaction Graph
The proposed multi-layer interaction graph has three layers. Each layer is
comprised of key intra-layer links and components which contribute the most to
outage propagation from one specific perspective, i.e. the number of line
outages, the amount of load shedding, and the propagated electrical distance.
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Figure 2-11. Subgraph influenced by a link in the first layer.

For the first layer, a directed acyclic subgraph starting from the link i→j
can be extracted from Ltotal as shown in Fig. 2-11, and this subgraph (denoted by
C(i→j) ) is unique and comprised of all the components influenced by link i→j. To
identify the key links, an index called the Cascading Outage Contribution (COC)
is proposed to quantify the contribution of a link to propagation of outages in
terms of the number of line outages. Given Ni times of component i outage, the
expectation of the number of component j outages is

E j  Ni Pij

(2.11)

where Pij is the empirical probability that the outage of component i causes the
outage of component j. For any component c  C (i  j ) , c  j , the expectation of
the number of outages given the times of its source component outage is

Ec  Ecs Pcs j

(2.12)

where cs is the source outage of component c. Then define
COCiI j 



cC ( i  j )

Ec

(2.13)

which quantifies the total expected value of component outages that propagate
through link i→j. It can characterize the extent of the outage propagation in terms
of the number of line outages. The larger COCiI j , the more critical the link. The
set of key links can be obtained from those having the largest weights, e.g.
LIkey  l | COClI  I COClImax 
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(2.14)

where COClImax is the largest value of COCI for all links in the database and 1> I

 0 is the threshold.
To quantify the contribution of component i to the propagation of outages,
define the out-strength index (OS) as
OSiI 

COC



I
l

l ( i )

(2.15)

where  (i) is the set of links starting from component i. The out-strength of a
component quantifies how much a component influences the others components.
The components with large OSI can cause great consequences and thus play
crucial roles in the propagation of outages. The set of key components is
obtained by selecting those components having the largest OS I ’s as



I
Ckey
 i OSiI   I OSiImax



(2.16)

where OSiImax is the largest OSI for all components and 1>  I  0 is the threshold.
Note that if an isolated key component exists in one layer that is not
I
involved in any key link, it should be removed from Ckey
since it is not very useful
II
to analyze the propagation of outages. The same handling is applied to Ckey
and
III
Ckey
defined later.

i
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Figure 2-12. Subgraph influenced by a link in the second layer.

Using directed acyclic subgraph shown in Fig 2-12, the key links in the
second layer can be identified by means of the COC of link i→j defined in (2.17)
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to quantify the consequence with propagation of outages in terms of the amount
of load shedding.
COCiII j 



lC ( i  j )

(2.17)

Wl

where Wl is the average amount of load shedding triggered by link l.
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Figure 2-13. Subgraph influenced by a link in the third layer.

Similarly, using the subgraph in Fig. 2-13, the key links in the third layer
are identified by the COC of link i→j defined in (2.18), where Dtpath is the total
electrical distance for the t-th path starting from link i→j, Npath is the number of
paths starting from component j, Gt is the number of links along the t-th path, and

Z k is the electrical distance for the k-th link along the t-th path. COCiIII j can
quantify the average distance of outage propagation starting from link i→j.
N path
III
i j

COC



D
t 1

path

Gt

t

N path

,

where Dt

path

  Zk

(2.18)

k 1

The key links and components in the second and third layers can be
identified by a method similar to (2.14)-(2.16). Their sets of key links and key
II
III
components are denoted by LIIkey , Ckey
, LIII
key , and Ckey , respectively. Note that the

key links and key components within a single layer are called key intra-layer links
and components in order to distinguish them with the following inter-layer links
and inter-layer components.
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In real-world power systems, for example, consider how the transmission
line outages spread in the August 10 1996 Western interconnection blackout in
[104]. Occurrences of early outages did not cause obviously severe
consequences on the system but did cause some transitions underneath to
increase vulnerability of the system. In this chapter, inter-layer links are also
proposed in order to understand the transitioning of the outage propagation
across different layers.

i
Intra-layer link
First layer
j
j
Inter-layer link

k
k

h

Intra-layer link

Second layer

Figure 2-14. An inter-layer link between the first and second layers.

Fig. 2-14 illustrates an inter-layer link connecting the first and second
layers, where link i→j is an intra-layer link in the first layer and link k→h is an
intra-layer link of the second layer. Link j→k is an inter-layer link starting with the
destination component outage of the first link and ending at the source
component outage of the second link. The total number of candidate inter-layer
links between any two layers equals the product of the number of their key intralayer links. The following two steps can identify the key inter-layer links on the
most frequent inter-layer transitions and the key inter-layer components involved
in those transitions: 1) for any two layers s and d, select the top  % links from

Ltotal  Lskey  Ldkey as the key inter-layer links; 2) all components involved in the
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source component outages of those key inter-layer links are defined as key interlayer components.

2.4

Mitigation Strategies

2.4.1 Weakening of Key Intra-Layer Links
The propagation of cascading outages could be mitigated by weakening
key intra-layer links [27]. When the source component of a key intra-layer link is
tripped and causes the overloading of its destination component, that destination
component will be tripped at a reduced probability to simulate intentional relay
blocking as mitigation of outage propagation. In this way, cascades can be
generated by simulations with that mitigation strategy.
In this chapter, the following six mitigation strategies that weaken a
number (denoted by K, e.g. 20-100) of intra-layer links from different
perspectives are compared:


Strategy-LO: Weaken the top-K key intra-layer links in the first layer in
terms of the number of line outages.



Strategy-LS: Weaken the top-K key intra-layer links in the second layer
in terms of the amount of load shedding.



Strategy-ED: Weaken the top-K key intra-layer links in the third layer in
terms of the propagated electrical distance.



Strategy-3L: Weaken the top-K/3 key intra-layer links of the three
layers.



Strategy-LOLS: Weaken the top-K/2 key intra-layer links in the first
layer and the top-K/2 key intra-layer links in the second layer in
different stages of cascades.



Strategy-R: Weakening randomly selected K intra-layer links for
comparison purposes.

Strategy-LO, Strategy-LS, and Strategy-ED are single-layer mitigation
strategies. Strategy-3L is an integrated mitigation strategy in which the key intralayer links are from the three layers. Strategy-LOLS is an integrated mitigation
46

strategy in which the key intra-layer links are from the first and second layers.
The key intra-layer links from the two layers are weakened in different stages of
cascading outages. The key intra-layer links in the first layer are weakened in the
early stage (generation 1 to 2) of cascading outages, and the key intra-layer links
from the second layer are weakened in the later stage (generations 2 to 3) of
cascading outages.
2.4.2 Validation of Mitigation Strategies
To validate a mitigation strategy, simulation of cascading outages is
performed with each of the above strategies to generate a new database of
cascades. Then, compared to the original database without mitigation, each
mitigation strategy is evaluated by the reduced proportion of the average number
of line outages, the average amount of load shedding, or the average electrical
distance of outage propagation for each cascade. More specifically, the
propagated electrical distance for one cascade is

EDcascade 

N gen 1

 max{ED
g 1

g , g 1

}

(2.19)

where max{EDg,g+1} is the maximal electrical distance between generation g and
g+1 by going through all of links connecting these two generations, and Ngen is
the number of generations for one cascade.
In general, a mitigation strategy that weakens the key intra-layer links from
one layer can significantly mitigate the problem concerned by that layer
compared to the random intra-layer link weakening and the key intra-layer link
weakening for a different layer. It is anticipated that Strategy-LO can reduce the
number of line outages much more effectively than Strategy-R, Strategy-LS, and
Strategy-ED. Thus, the multi-layer interaction graph provides a way to choose
the most effective strategy mitigating the most critical type of problems in
cascading outages.

2.5

Number of Cascades Needed for a Database
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More cascades tend to contain more information about the property of
cascading outages. As a result, the number of identified links will increase and
the COCs and the rankings of links can change. However, the rankings of the
top-TL key intra-layer links will stay unchanged after the number of cascades
exceeds a threshold Mmin. Mmin can be determined by a procedure similar to the
methods in [26] and [27]: gradually increasing the number of cascades, recording
the set of top-TL key intra-layer links, and finding the smallest number of
cascades beyond which the top key intra-layer links do not change. Specifically,
for the multi-layer interaction graph, the following steps are taken to determine
Mmin that make every layer have stable top-TL key intra-layer links. Because the
set of inter-layer links depend on the components of the key intra-layer links, the
resulting the set of inter-layer links are also stable.
Let Mi, i=1, 2,…, TM be a series of numbers gradually increased by M as
candidate numbers of cascades to be included into the database. STL ( M i ) is the
set of top-TL key intra-layer links from Mi cascades. Define

R(M i ) | STL (M i 1 )  STL (M i ) | /TL

(2.20)

which gives the ratio between the number of common key intra-layer links from
two consecutive numbers of cascades and TL. Then we calculate the standard
deviation i of R(Mi) around Mi as (2.21). Then Mmin is determined as the smallest
Mi with i less than a given tolerance τ .

 i   ([ R(M i 2 ),

R(M i 1 ),

R(M i )]), i  2

(2.21)

The number of cascades needed is the maximum value among the Mmins
for the three layers.

2.6

Case Studies
A database of 10000 independent cascades is produced by simulations in

MATLAB using the improved DC OPA model in [39] on an NPCC 140-bus
system shown in Fig. 2-15. The total time cost is about 13800 seconds on a
desktop PC with Intel Core i7-3770K 3.40GHz and 4GB RAM.
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Figure 2-15. NPCC 140-bus system.

Line flow limits are critical parameters in the simulation of cascading
outages. Here, the “N-1” security criterion is applied to the system and there is no
overloaded line after any “N-1” contingency. Therefore the initial outages for
simulations are selected from “N-k” (k≥2) contingencies in the NYISO area. The
load variation at each load bus is assumed to follow uniform distribution in [0.95,
1.05]. The probability of the line tripping depends on its loading according to
Table 2-5 from [90].
Table 2-5. Probability of Tripping with Line Loading.
Line Loading (% of Limit)
100
110
120
130
140
150

Probability of Tripping
0.10
0.30
0.60
0.80
0.95
1.00

In the real-time operation environment, if initial outages have occurred and
tend to spread to a wide area, the system operator needs to make an immediate
decision to evaluate and mitigate the outages. It would be time consuming to
simulate a single cascade in time domain using detailed and accurate models on
all power system components, so it is impossible to online simulate many
possible cascades starting from the same initial outages in order to predict how
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the cascading outages might propagate. For example, for the NPCC 140-bus
system, the time costs for even the powerflow-based DC OPA model and AC
OPA model to simulate 100 cascades are 128s and 504s on a desktop PC. For a
utility-scale power system having tens of thousands of buses, simulations on
even powerflow-based models also become unacceptably slow. Thus, it is more
reasonable to utilize the proposed interaction graph constructed based on a
database of offline simulated cascades. The models to be used in offline
simulation can be detailed sufficiently to consider protective actions and system
dynamics over a wide range from transient dynamics to mid-term or long-term
dynamics to ensure the credibility of the database. Thus, online simulation can
be avoided and the real-time application of this interaction graph constructed
from the database for real-time prediction will be fast and practical.
2.6.1 A Multi-Layer Interaction Graph
A multi-layer interaction graph with three layers is visualized in Figs. 2-162-18. Each layer contains top-100 key intra-layer links and top-20 key intra-layer
components. All components (i.e. transmission lines) of the NPCC system are
represented by gray nodes (each located at the middle of the line), key intra-layer
components are highlighted as green dots and key intra-layer links are
represented by red arrows.
Note that the multi-layer interaction graph may vary with changes on the
system topology and load level. If the changes are large, e.g. global load
variations on the whole system, the set of key intra-layer links and component in
each layer can vary significantly. Subsection 2.6.3 compares the interaction
graphs respectively from the original database and a new database of cascades
considering global load variations on the whole system.
Note that if the changes are small, e.g. slight load variations in a local
area, most of key intra-layer links and components in other areas are still valid
and important predictors on how outages may propagate. Thus, only some key
intra-layer links and components in that local area need to be updated using the
database having new cascades included. It will be investigated in the future work.
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Figure 2-16. Top-100 key intra-layer links and top-20 key intra-layer components in terms of the
number of line outages.

Figure 2-17. Top-100 key intra-layer links and top-20 key intra-layer components in terms of the
amount of load shedding (excluding 2 isolated components).
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Figure 2-18. Top-100 key intra-layer links and top-20 key intra-layer components in terms of the
propagated electrical distance (excluding 3 isolated components).

The overlapped links between different layers are very few as listed in
Table 2-6, indicating the independency of the three types of key intra-layer links.
Table 2-6. Numbers of Overlapped Links between Different Layers.
Number of Key Intralayer Links in Each
Layer
20
50
100

Number of Overlapped Links between
Two layers
st
nd
st
rd
nd
rd
1 and 2
1 and 3
2 and 3
Layers
Layers
Layers
0
0
0
1
4
0
4
7
7

The numbers of occurrences for the top-100 key intra-layer links in
different layers are given by Fig. 2-19. The key intra-layer links in the first layer
has much more occurrences than the key intra-layer links in the second layer. It
indicates that the links with large occurrences have high probabilities to be
identified as the key intra-layer links of the first layer, which is reasonable from
the definitions (2.11)-(2.13). Those links with a large number of occurrences have
high probabilities to be identified as the key intra-layer links in the first layer.
However, these links may not be identified as the key intra-layer links in terms of
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the amount of load shedding. For the key intra-layer links in the second layer,
although they occur much less often than those of the first and third layers, they
contribute the most to the amount of load shedding. For the key intra-layer links

Number of occurrences

in the third layer, the number of occurrences is distributed more dispersedly.

100
First layer
Second layer
Third layer

50

0
0

20

40
60
Link numbering

80

100

Figure 2-19. Numbers of occurrences for key intra-layer links in different layers.

Figure 2-20. Comparison for the assessment indices for the top-100 key intra-layer links in
different layers (Index I - average number of line outages; Index II - average amount of load
shedding; Index III- average propagated electrical distance).

For a further comparison, the average number of line outages, the
average amount of load shedding and the average propagated electrical distance
are calculated as Indices I, II and III, respectively for the top-100 key links from
different layers and then are normalized to [0,1] as shown in Fig. 2-20. The
comparison confirms the distinct focuses of three layers; i.e. the index matching
the focus of the layer has the highest value.
2.6.2 Key Inter-Layer Links and Components
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Cascading outages may propagate within a single layer of the interaction
graph or may cross to a different layer directly or through an inter-layer link. It is
important for the system operators to monitor the inter-layer transitioning since it
indicates the consequences of outages becoming less monotype. Here the
numbers of inter-layer links between different layers for different numbers of key
intra-layer links are shown in Fig. 2-21. The number of inter-layer links increases

Number of inter-layer links

a lot with the increase of the number of key intra-layer links.

400
300

First-second layer
First-third layer
Second-third layer

200
100
0
0

20
40
60
80
Number of key intra-layer links

100

Figure 2-21. Numbers of inter-layer links for different numbers of key intra-layer links.

Fig. 2-22 shows only the top-15 key intra-layer links in each layer and the
key inter-layer links between different layers. The number of inter-layer links
between the first and second layers, the first and third layers, and the second
and third layers are 65, 22, and 16, respectively. The sets of key inter-layer links
between different layers can be selected from the top =50% of candidate interlayer links. The number of key inter-layers between the first and second layers,
the first and third layers, and the second and third layers are determined as 12,
6, and 4, respectively. The numbers of key inter-layer components involved in the
key inter-layer links between the first and second layers, the first and third layers,
and the second and third layers are 7, 5, and 3, respectively, as highlighted in
Fig. 2-22.
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Figure 2-22. Schematic diagram of key inter-layer links, key inter-layer components, and key
st
nd
st
rd
intra-layer links (key inter-layer links between the 1 and 2 layers, between the 1 and 3
nd
rd
layers, and between the 2 and 3 layers are magenta, brown and cyan arrows, respectively;
intra-layer links in each layer are red arrows; key inter-layer components involved in the key interst
nd
st
rd
nd
layer links between the 1 and 2 layers, between the 1 and 3 layers, and between the 2
rd
and 3 layers are orange, pink and black dots; key inter-layer components involved in the key
st
rd
st
inter-layer links between the 1 and 3 layers are also located in the 1 layer).
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Note that the set of key inter-layers links depends on the selection of the
key intra-layer links. An inter-layer link could become an intra-layer link in another
case and vice versa. From the number of inter-layer links and key inter-layer links
between different layers, we can find that the correlation between the first and
second layers is tighter than any other two layers. Many inter-layer links connect
the key intra-layer links in the first layer to those in the second layer. This
observation can help to propose an integrated mitigation strategy by combing the
key intra-layer links from the two layers and weaken them in different stages of
cascading outages.
2.6.3 Multi-Layer Interaction Graph for Increased System Load
The variation of system topology, unit commitments and system load level
will definitely affect the multi-layer interaction graph. Here the influence of the
load variation on the multi-layer interaction graph is analyzed. Under this case,
the load level of the system is scaled up by 10% which is uniformly added to
each load bus of the system. The new database with the same number of
cascades as the original database is generated for the new system load level.
The three layers with key intra-layer links and components are shown by Figs. 223-2-25.
The identified key intra-layer links in each layer with 110% and 100% load
levels of the system are compared. The numbers of overlapped links by
comparing different numbers of key intra-layer links are shown in Fig. 2-26. From
a sensitivity study on the number of overlapped links, the key intra-layer links in
the first and second layers are more sensitive to the global load variation of the
system than those in the third layer.
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Figure 2-23. Top-100 key intra-layer links and top-20 key intra-layer components in terms of the
number of line outages at 110% system load (red/blue arrows are overlapped/different links
compared to 100% system load; green/yellow dots are overlapped/different components
compared to 100% system load).

Figure 2-24. Top-100 key intra-layer links and top-20 key intra-layer components in terms of the
amount of load shedding with 110% system load.
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Figure 2-25. Top-100 key intra-layer links and top-20 key intra-layer components in terms of the
propagated electrical distance with 110% system load (excluding 7 isolated components).

Figure 2-26. Numbers of overlapped links for different numbers of key intra-layer links.

Figure 2-27. Distribution of key intra-layer links in transitions of generations.
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2.6.4 Distribution of Key Intra-Layer Links among Generations
A key intra-layer link in a specific layer may connect two consecutive
generations in either early or later stages of a cascade. For each of the three
layers, the distribution of the top-100 key intra-layer links in transitions between
generations is shown in Fig. 2-27. The maximum number of generations involved
in the links is 6.
The majority of the key intra-layer links of the first layer connect
generations 1 and 2, and also the majority of the key intra-layer links in the third
layer connect generations 1 and 2. These observations suggest that reducing
line outages to limit the spreading of outages should have a high priority in the
early stage of cascading outages, and the system operators should pay more
attention to the first and third layers of the interaction graph. The key intra-layer
links in terms of load shedding are more dispersed and mainly connect
generations 1, 2, and 3. The increased percentage of key links from generations
2 to 3 indicates that load shedding is the main problem in later stages. It is
reasonable to have more load shedding in later stages of a cascading outage.
These observations enlighten us to propose the Strategy-LOLS mentioned
in Section 2.4.1, i.e. an integrated mitigation strategy to weaken the key intralayer links in the first layer in the early stage (generations 1 to 2) of cascading
outages and key intra-layer links in the second layer in the later stage of
cascading outage (generations 2 to 3). In fact, the majority of cascades in the
database contain 3 generations and the average number of generations is 3.14.
2.6.5

Validation of Mitigation Strategies
When the source component of a key intra-layer link fails, the destination

component may become overloaded and can be tripped by protective relays.
Each mitigation strategy considered here reduces the probability of the relay
tripping to 10%. The number (i.e. K) of intra-layer links to be weakened is set up
as 20 for all the mitigation strategies. For Strategy-3L, the numbers of key intralayer links in the first, second, and third layers are set up as 7, 7, and 6,
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respectively. The case for Strategy-R is simulated for 20 times. These mitigation
strategies are compared in terms of three assessment indices as shown in Table
2-7.
Strategy-LO can significantly reduce the average number of line outages
by 24.36%. Strategy-ED can reduce the average number of line outage but not
significantly because the first and third layers show relevant properties from Fig.
2-19 and Fig. 2-20. Strategy-LS and Strategy-R may even increase the number.
Similarly, Strategy-LS significantly reduces the average amount of load
shedding by 69.21%. However, Strategy-ED and Strategy-LO reduce it slightly
and Strategy-R even increases it for some cascades.
The average propagated electrical distance can be reduced by 18.87% by
Strategy-ED. Strategy-LO only reduces it slightly and Strategy-LS and Strategy-R
may even increase the propagation.
The results validate that a specific problem, e.g. number of line outages,
amount of load shedding, and propagated electrical distance, can be effectively
mitigated by a strategy that weakens key intra-layer links from a matched layer.
Strategy-R may even increase the average number of line outages, load
shedding and average electrical distance, which indicates the ineffectiveness of
the random mitigation strategy.
Strategy-LS increases the average number of line outages and the
average propagated electrical distance. This is because the mitigation strategy is
not to stop the propagation of outages but change the direction of propagation.
Weakening key links of a wrong type may even bring negative impacts.
Strategy-3L reduces the average number of line outages, the average
amount of load shedding, and the average propagated electrical distance by
26.54%, 65.31%, and 15.65%. It is obvious since the key intra-layer links are
combined from the three layers.
Strategy-LOLS is applied to different stages of cascading outages with the
key intra-layer links from the two layers. A link will be weakened if it is between
generations 1 and 2 and belongs to the top-10 key links of the first layer, or if it is
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between generations 2 and 3 and belongs to the top-10 key links of the second
layer. It reduces the average number of line outages and average amount of load
shedding by 25.78% and 56.46%, respectively. This validates that the key links in
the first layer are highly relevant to early stages of outages and key links in the
second layer are more involved in later stages of outages.
In general, for each link, the number of its mitigation under Strategy-3L is
larger than that under Strategy-LOLS. That is because a link may appear in
different stages of outages varying from different cascades. Strategy-3L will
weaken it wherever it appears. However, Strategy-LOLS only weaken it when it
appears in a pre-determined stage of cascading outages.
Table 2-7. Influences of Different Mitigation Strategies on Different Assessment Indices.
Mitigation
Strategies
Strategy-LO
Strategy-LS
Strategy-ED
Strategy-3L
Strategy-LOLS
Strategy-R

Average Number
of Line Outages
-24.36%
+3.67%
-8.15%
-26.54%
-25.78%
-3.23% to +4.21%

Average Amount of
Load Shedding
-3.29%
-69.21%
-4.73%
-65.31%
-56.46%
-6.59% to +7.94%

Average Propagated
Electrical Distance
-6.44%
+4.52%
-18.87%
-15.65%
-9.11%
-1.66% to +2.79%

It is suggested that the system operators can monitor the propagation of
outages based on the first and third layers of the interaction graph during the
early stage of outages. With the spread of cascading outages, more attentions
should be paid to the second layer. Then the strategy of weakening key intralayer links of the corresponding layer can be applied, which is shown by
Strategy-LOLS as one example. Incomplete information from a single layer
interaction graph could mislead the system operators to take inappropriate
control actions and may enlarge the propagation of outages undesignedly. The
multi-layer interaction graph can provide comprehensive information helpful for
online monitoring and mitigation of cascading outages.
2.6.6

Determining the Number of Cascades
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As an example, the number of cascades for identifying top-100 key intralayer links in the second layer is presented here. The number of cascades in
other layers can be determined by the same approach.
Set TM =100, M1=100, M =100, and



=0.01. Fig. 2-28 shows how R(Mi)

and its standard deviation i change with the number of cascades. They become
flat when cascades reach a specific number Mmin, which is around 3600, meaning
that the top-100 key links in the second layer can be identified using 3600
cascades. The number of cascades needed for a database can be determined as
5200, which is the maximum value among all Mmin’s for three layers. The number
of cascades used in this chapter, i.e. 10000, is large enough.
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Figure 2-28. R and  for different numbers of cascades.

2.7

Conclusions of this Chapter
This chapter first extends the interaction network and interaction model

proposed in [27] to the NPCC power system to identify the key links and
components that play important roles to the propagation of cascading outages.
Then it proposes a multi-layer interaction graph on cascading outages of power
systems as an extension of the single layer interaction network proposed in [27].
It intends to assist the system operators in predicting propagation of outages and
making decisions on mitigation actions. The multi-layer interaction graph can be
obtained offline from a database of simulated or historical cascades and then
applied online. The graph comprises multiple layers respectively depicting key
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components and key links that contribute the most to outage propagation from
different perspectives, i.e. the number of line outages, the amount of load
shedding and the electrical distance of outage propagation. Two types of key
links, i.e. key intra-layer link and key inter-layer link and their corresponding key
components are proposed and defined. They together provide comprehensive
information for the monitoring and mitigation of cascading outages. Meanwhile,
key intra-layer link based mitigation strategies corresponding to each layer and
two integrated mitigation strategies are also proposed and validated on the
NPCC 140-bus system.

63

CHAPTER THREE
SIMULATION OF CASCADING OUTAGES USING A
POWER-FLOW MODEL CONSIDERING FREQUENCY
3.1

Introduction
Many models and approaches for the simulation of cascading outages

mentioned in Chapter 1 can be categorized as steady-state models, quasidynamic models and dynamic models basically. For instance, the CASCADE,
DCSIMSEP, branching process, OPA, Hidden failure, and Interaction model can
be characterized as steady-state models. The multi-timescale quasi-dynamic
model considers system steady-state behaviors in different timescales. And the
COSMIC and Hybrid models are uses dynamic simulation to simulate cascading
outages.
The major drawback of dynamic simulation is its intense time consumption
in large system models. Also as mentioned by [42], although nonlinear transients
are often prominent in fast cascade stages, in other cases the transients fade
away and system reaches steady state quickly, so the power flow based steadystate or quasi-dynamic models are sufficient for representing the cascading
process instead of dynamic simulation.
Frequency is an important indicator of the real-time balance between
active power of generation and load, especially during cascading outages.
Abnormal frequency deviation may trigger under-frequency load shedding
(UFLS) [105][106] and generator frequency protection, causing large amount of
loss in generation and load, so it is a significant contributing factor of cascading
outages and blackouts [107]. A conventional power flow model assumes the
system frequency to be always constant by means of one or multiple swing
buses to eliminate any active power imbalance. However, ideal swing buses with
infinite capability of power balancing and frequency regulation do not exist in real
power systems. In practice, frequency is regulated in a distributed way: first,
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governors of generators regulate their speeds and active power outputs following
their designed regulation strategies; second, frequency-sensitive loads in a
system also vary their actual power consumptions with the frequency deviation.
Therefore, it is important to consider frequency-related system behaviors and
operations in the simulation of cascading outages.
Since the 1970’s, efforts have been made to include frequency deviation
in power flow models [108]. In ref. [109] published in 1986, a “dynamic load flow”
(DLF) algorithm in which the unbalanced active power is allocated among all
generators with speed controllers was proposed, but such a model cannot obtain
the frequency. In ref. [110], the frequency is taken as an unknown variable in
DLF calculation. In recent decades, for the purposes of fast simulation or
analysis with large power systems, many power flow models considering
frequency have been proposed [111]-[121], which mainly incorporate powerfrequency characteristics into a power-flow model and consider power-frequency
characteristics with loads, speed governors of generators or automatic
generation control (AGC). Refs. [112] and [113] consider power-frequency and
voltage dependent characteristics of loads and speed governors of generators in
power flow models with dispatcher training simulators. Ref. [114] considers
power-frequency and voltage dependent characteristics with loads, voltagereactive power characteristic of generators, speed governors of generators in
power flow models for security assessment of power systems. Refs. [115]-[117]
incorporate power-frequency characteristics of active loads and speed governors
of generators into power flow models for risk assessment. Other fields to apply
such power-flow models include microgrid control [118][119] and analyses
involving wind generation [120][121]. Analysis and simulation of cascading
outages can also apply such models. Refs. [122] and [123] incorporate frequency
deviation into cascading outage simulation based on a DC power flow model, in
which

frequency

deviation

is

calculated

directly

from

power-frequency

characteristics of generators and loads.
This chapter proposes a novel steady-state approach for simulation of
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cascading outages with frequency-related system characteristics and operation
actions such as frequency deviation, power-frequency characteristics of
generators and loads, UFLS scheme, and generator frequency protection [124].
The contributions of this chapter are mainly in these three aspects. First, the
proposed approach integrates calculation of frequency deviation into a power
flow model like [109] (called “DLF model” in the rest of the chapter since it is
developed and inspired from the DLF algorithm in [108]-[116]). Thus, power flow
results are able to reflect active power imbalance and address power-frequency
characteristics of generators and loads. Second, an AC optimal power flow
model considering frequency deviation (for short, AC-OPFf) is proposed, which
determines remedial control against system collapse indicated by divergent
power flow calculation. Thanks to the consideration of frequency deviation, the
DLF and AC-OPFf models enable more credible steady-state simulation on a
power system under cascading outages. Third, the proposed approach enables
the UFLS scheme and generator frequency protection to be modeled, which is
critical but has not yet been addressed by existing steady-state approaches for
simulation of cascading outages.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the
proposed simulation approach for cascading outages. It first introduces the DLF
model employed in the proposed approach, proposes the novel AC-OPFf model,
and then presents the UFLS scheme as well as generator frequency and line
protection models used in the proposed approach, and finally compares the
procedure of the proposed approach with a conventional approach for simulation
of cascading outages. Comprehensive case studies are presented in Section 3.3,
which first benchmarks the results of the DLF model with that of time-domain
simulation on a two-area system, and then tests the proposed approach using
many cascading outage scenarios on the IEEE 39-bus system and NPCC 48machine, 140-bus systems. The simulated cascading outages are analyzed and
compared with those from the conventional approach. Finally, Section 3.4 draws
the conclusions.
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3.2

Proposed Simulation Approach for Cascading Outages
This section first briefly introduces the DLF model and proposes the AC-

OPFf model, which is compared with a conventional AC-OPF model. Then, the
section presents the UFLS scheme, as well as the generator and line protection
models to be used in the proposed simulation approach.
3.2.1 DLF Model
The static power-frequency characteristics (SPFCs) of a load at bus i can
be approximated by

PDi  PD0i (1  Di f d ) , f d  f  f n

(3.1)

where f is the system frequency, fn is the nominal frequency, fd is the frequency
deviation, PD0i is the active power load at fn, and constant Di quantifies frequencysensitivity of the load, showing how active the load changes with frequency
deviation.
When active power balance of the system cannot be maintained at the
nominal frequency, a frequency deviation exists. The speed governor of a
generator at bus i can automatically regulate its steady-state output PGi according
to its regulation factor Ri:

PGi  PG 0i  f d / Ri , PGi ,min  PGi  PGi,max

(3.2)

where PG0i is its active power output at fn, and PGi.min and PGi.max are the lower and
upper limits of active power output.
Consider an n-bus power system having m PQ buses (numbered from 1 to
m), n-m-1 PV buses (numbered from m+1 to n-1), and a slack bus with No. n.
The DPF calculation targets at eliminating active power mismatches at all n
buses and reactive power mismatches at m PQ buses.

Pi  PGi  PDi  Vi V j (Gij cos ij  Bij sin ij ) i  1,..., n

(3.3)

ji

Qi  QGi  QDi  Vi V j (Gij sin ij  Bij cos ij ) i  1,..., m
ji
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(3.4)

where PGi and PDi are calculated from (3.1)-(3.2), QGi and QDi are the reactive
power of generation and load at bus i, which are assumed frequencyindependent. Vi is the voltage magnitude at bus i, ij=i-j is the phase angle
difference between buses i and j, and Gij and Bij are the real and imaginary
elements in the bus admittance matrix.
Mismatches Pi and Qi make up an n-vector Pn1 for all buses and an mvector Qm1 for all PQ buses. Note that there are n+m unknown variables
including frequency deviation fd, n-1 voltage angles and m voltage magnitudes.
The DPF problem can be solved using the Newton-Raphson method by solving
the corrections:
 θ( n 1)1 
 P( n 1)1 
 Pn1  



(3.5)
 Q    Pn

  J  f d
m1 

 V 1 V 
 Q m1 


 mm m1 
P


J 2 ( n 1)m 
 J 1 ( n 1)( n 1) f
d ( n 1)1


 Pn

Pn
J
N1m 
where
f d
 θ 1( n 1)

 J 3 m( n 1)
0
J 4 mm 

In (3.5), Pn is the active power mismatch of the slack bus, which will be

eliminated unlike that in conventional power flow calculation, P( n1)1 includes
active power mismatches of the other buses, θ( n1)1 is the vector of angle
corrections for all buses except for the slack bus, f d is the correction of system
frequency deviation, Vm1m is a diagonal matrix made of the reciprocals of Vi’s of
m PQ buses, and Vm1 is the vector of corrections of Vi’s for all PQ buses.
The Jacobian matrix J is an (n+m)-dimensional square matrix containing
partial derivatives of the active and reactive power injections with respect to
voltage angles, magnitudes and fd. The elements of J1, J2, J3 and J4 in the i-th
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row and j-th column are

Pi Pi
Q
Qi
V j , i , and
V j , i.e. the same as the
,
 j V j
 j
V j

corresponding elements in the Jacobian matrix of conventional power flow
model. Let the bus angle n of the slack bus be zero. The other elements of J
are:
for PQ buses
 PD 0i Di
 P  Pi 

, i  1,..., n
1

 

(
P
D

)
for
PV
and
slack
buses

f

f
D
0
i
i
 d i
d

Ri

 Pn  Pn
 VnV j (Gnj sin  j  Bnj cos  j ), j  1,..., n 1

 
 θ  j  j

N j 

Pn
V j  VnV j (Gnj cos  j  Bnj sin  j ), j  1,..., m
V j

(3.6)

(3.7)

(3.8)

Solving the DLF model by the N-R method does not bring much more
computational burden than solving a conventional power flow model because
only one unknown variable and one equation are added. Note that by considering
the active power generation limits, constraint PGi ,min  PG 0i  f d / Ri  PGi ,max is
checked with updated fd at each iteration of the N-R method. If the constraint is
violated, freeze PGi at the limit.
From (3.5), the Jacobian matrix J with the DLF model has the similar
sparsity to that with the conventional power flow model, but has more nonzero
elements because of the introduced frequency deviation fd. J with the DLF model
has at most 2n+m-1 more nonzero elements than that of the conventional power
flow model. Consider the total number of elements of the J is (n+m-1)2 for a
conventional power flow model or to be (n+m)2 for the DLF model, the ratio of
2n+m-1 to (n+m-1)2 or (n+m)2 is very small for a large power system. Therefore,
the J with the DLF model is still quite sparse. For example, the ratio (2n+m1)/(n+m-1)2 is just equal to 0.007 for the NPCC 48-machine, 140-bus power
system.

69

Finally, there are the following remarks on the DLF model used in the
proposed approach:
Remarks:
1) In industry practices, AGC is usually disabled in simulation of cascading
outages, so this chapter does not consider AGC or secondary frequency
regulation in the proposed approach.
2) Reactive power loads are less sensitive to a frequency deviation than
active power loads, and are often assumed frequency-independent in refs. [115][117], which is also assumed so in this chapter.
3) In a conventional power flow model, buses are categorized into PQ
buses, PV buses and swing buses. The DLF model may inherit those bus types
[125], which indicate the quantities that are basically unchanged. For instance,
PD0i in (3.1) and PG0i in (3.2) respectively correspond to “P” components in PQ
and PV buses. In fact, PD0i and PG0i slightly vary with frequency deviation around
certain constant values. Strictly speaking, PV and PQ buses in a DLF model only
maintain constant voltage magnitudes and reactive power injections. Finally, only
one swing bus is needed for the DLF model, which is mainly used as a reference
bus for voltage angles.
3.2.2 Dynamic Load Flow Model
During cascading outage simulation, calculation with the DLF model
described by (3.1)-(3.8) may diverge, indicating a significantly stressed condition
or event system collapse, which can be mitigated by remedial control such as
generation redispatch and load shedding. The proposed AC-OPFf model is
presented as (3.9) in Table 3-1 to model a centralized remedial control scheme.
It is compared with a conventional AC-OPF model (3.10) side by side about the
objective function and constraints.
In the AC-OPFf model, the objective function is to keep the largest
remaining active power load after remedial control. The weighting factor i
quantifies the importance of load at bus i. The control variables of AC-OPFf
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model are PGi, PDi, QGi, QDi, Vi, i, and fd, respectively. Here PGi and PDi are
corresponding to equations (3.1) and (3.2). First two constraints are power flow
equations (3.9a and 3.9b). The rest of constraints are about power generations
(3.9c and 3.9d), bus voltage magnitudes (3.9e and 3.9f), loads (3.9g and 3.9h),
branch flows (3.9i), constant power factor (3.9j), and frequency deviation (3.9k).
Note that in the AC-OPFf model, one equality constraint (3.9a) and three
inequality constraints, (3.9c), (3.9g), and (3.9k), involve frequency deviation, so
the final calculated frequency deviation may not meet its upper or lower limit in
(3.9k) if a limit in (3.9c) or (3.9g) is met.
Table 3-1. AC-OPFf and AC-OPF Models.
AC-OPFf

AC-OPF
min - i PDi

min - i PDi
i

i

s.t.

s.t.
Pi  PGi  PDi

Pi  PGi  PDi
 Vi  V j (Gij cos ij  Bij sin ij )  0 (3.9a)

 Vi  V j (Gij cos ij  Bij sin ij )  0 (3.10a)

j

j

Qi  QGi  QDi

Qi  QGi  QDi

 Vi  V j (Gij sin ij  Bij cos ij )  0 (3.9b)

 Vi  V j (Gij sin ij  Bij cos ij )  0 (3.10b)

j

j

PGi ,min  PGi  PGi ,max

(3.9c)

QGi ,min  QGi  QGi ,max

PGi ,min  PGi  PGi ,max

(3.10c)

(3.9 d )

Vi ,min  Vi  Vi ,max

QGi ,min  QGi  QGi ,max

(3.10 d )

(3.9 e)

Vi ,min  Vi  Vi ,max

(3.10 e)

(3.9 f )



  i 
2
2
0  PDi  PD 0i

(3.10 g )



  i 
2
2
0  PDi  PD 0i
0  QDi  QD 0i
| Sij | Sij ,max
QDi PD 0i 

PDi QD 0i
(1  Di f d )

f d min  f d  f d max

(3.9 g )
(3.9h)

(3.10 f )

0  QDi  QD 0i

(3.10h)

(3.9i)

| Sij | Sij ,max

(3.10i)

(3.9 j)

QDi PD 0i  PDiQD 0i

(3.10 j)

(3.9 k )

In the conventional AC-OPF model, the objective function is also to keep
the largest remaining active power load after control. The control variables of ACOPF model are PGi, PDi, QGi, QDi, Vi, and i, respectively. The constraints shown
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by (3.10a)-(3.10j) are similar to those of the AC-OPFf model except that
frequency deviation is not considered.
Compared with the AC-OPF model, the AC-OPFf model is more general
with consideration of frequency deviation. In fact, the AC-OPF model can be
regarded as a special case of the AC-OPFf model with fd equals zero.
The optimality of the final AC-OPF or AC-OPFf solution depends on what
algorithm is used and how much gap to the true global optimum is acceptable. In
the simulation of cascading outages, introduction of the AC-OPF or AC-OPFf
model does not aim at finding the best control strategy; rather, the mainly
purpose is to mimic remedial control by the central control room like the OPF
module in OPA models [39,40,126]. Therefore, the AC-OPF or AC-OPFf model
aims to find a new feasible power flow solution when system collapse happens.
In reality, if the proposed simulation approach is applied by power companies,
they may easily replace the AC-OPF or AC-OPFf model by their central remedial
control strategies.
3.2.3 Under-Frequency Load Shedding Scheme
The inclusion of frequency deviation in the DLF model also enables UFLS
to be simulated when there is a substantial, unacceptable frequency decline. A
practical UFLS scheme is typically designed to shed 25-30% of the system load
in steps with pre-designated loads in each reliability coordinator region when
frequency drops to a low threshold [2]. In addition, more load will be
progressively shed if frequency decline continues.
As given in Table 3-2, this chapter adopts an UFLS scheme in the
simulation of cascading outages for the proposed approach based on the NERC
UFLS reliability standard “PRC-006 NPCC” [127] for NPCC region.
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Table 3-2. UFLS Scheme of NPCC for Different Load Buses.
100MW or More
50 MW or more and
25 MW or more and less
Load
less than 100 MW
than 50 MW
ft (Hz)
Lp(%)
ft (Hz)
Lp (%)
ft (Hz)
Lp (%)
59.5
6.5
59.5
14
59.5
28
59.3
6.5
59.1
14
59.1
6.5
58.9
6.5
Note: ft and Lp stand for frequency threshold and percentage of load shed.

In general, shedding active power load PDi ,UFLS also cause curtailment of
an amount of reactive power load QDi ,UFLS . If the UFLS scheme is triggered, the
percentage of active power load to be shed is determined by frequency
thresholds in Table 3-2. Then the change in reactive power load is calculated by
(3.11) assuming a constant power factor to be maintained.

QDi ,UFLS
PDi ,UFLS
3.2.4



QDi
PDi

(3.11)

Generator Frequency and Transmission Line Protections
Protective actions with generators and transmission lines may introduce

additonal failures and uncertainties to system operations under cascading
outages [128], [129]. Utilization of the DLF model enables simulatons of some
frequency-related protecitve actions. Generator frequency and transmission line
protections are modeled in the proposed approach.
As illustrated by Fig. 3-1, according to the characteristics of the turbine
and power plant auxiliaries, the frequency span of a generator can be divided
into three types of ranges [129]: (1) the normal operation range bounded by f1
and f2, (2) two restricted time operation ranges outside the normal range
bounded by a lower limit fL and an upper limit fU, i.e. intervals [fL, f1] and [f2, fU],
and (3) prohibited ranges lower than fL or higher than fU.
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Figure 3-1. Relationship between generator trip probability and frequency.

The tripping probability (f) of generator i as a function of its frequency
relay is shown in Fig. 3-1 and (3.12), where 0 is the unexpected action
probability of generator frequency relay.
f  f L or f  fU
1
 (  1) f  f   f
1
0 1
 0
f L  f  f1

f  fL
( f )  
f1  f  f 2
0
 (1  0 ) f  0 fU  f 2
f 2  f  fU

fU  f 2


(3.12)

The proposed approach models both the UFLS scheme and generator
frequency protection, whose relay actions are in different timeframes. For
example, the typical time delay of a UFLS scheme is 0.1s for the Eastern
Interconnection [127] while the time delays of generator frequency relays vary
from 0.1s to several hundreds of seconds depending on the severity of frequency
deviation. Accordingly, the proposed simulation approach uses a module shown
in Fig. 3-2 to coordinate the UFLS scheme and generator frequency protection,
which performs UFLS for a higher priority than generator frequency protection as
long as the criterion of triggering UFLS is satisfied. Only if UFLS is not triggered,
generator frequency protection might be triggered at probability (f) defined by
(3.12). This module is embedded into the proposed approach shown by Fig. 3-3
and represented by the block “UFLS and generator frequency protection
module”.
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Figure 3-2. UFLS and generator frequency protection module.

With the propagation of cascading outages, a transmission line i-j is
overloaded if its apparent power Sij exceeds transmission capacity Sij,max. Each
overloaded line is tripped at a probability denoted by β and the probability of
tripping the rest of lines is assumed to be  

Sij
Sij ,max



. Here,  is a base probability

of any unwanted protection operation and should increase with the loading ratio
of the line [39].
Remark: the proposed approach is based on a steady-state power flow
model, so there is no explicit time evolution information. Unlike time-domain
simulation, the tripping sequence and dynamic process on generators are not
modeled in detail. In simulation by the proposed approach, once a generator is
tripped, it will not be recovered until the end of simulation.
3.2.5

Simulation Procedure of the Proposed Approach
The proposed approach for the simulation of cascading outages is shown

in Fig. 3-3. For comparison, a conventional approach for simulating cascading
outages is shown in Fig. 3-4, which replaces the DLF and AC-OPFf models by
the conventional power flow and AC-OPF models and does not consider the
UFLS scheme and generator frequency protection. The block “Parameters and
power network initialization” in both Fig. 3-3 and Fig. 3-4 performs conventional
power flow calculation to obtain a base operating condition with nominal system
frequency at 60Hz before the initial line outage is added at the next step.
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Figure 3-3. Simulation procedure of the proposed approach.

Figure 3-4. Simulation procedure of a conventional approach for comparison.
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If the system separates into islands during cascading outages, the bus
with the largest active power generation limit in each island can be chosen as the
swing bus for that island according to the suggestions from [130]. For the DLF
model, the function of the swing bus in each island is not to eliminate active
power imbalance by itself; rather, it and other PV buses will compensate the
active power imbalance depending on their power-frequency characteristics. The
swing bus is then used as a reference bus for voltage angles in each island. If
divergence is caused by a large imbalance in real power of any, the AC-OPFf or
AC-OPF model will be performed to search for a new solution.

3.3

Case Studies
This section first uses Kundur’s two-area, 4-machine power system [131]

to benchmark the frequency calculated by the DLF model with the steady-state
frequency obtained from time-domain simulation. Then, the section compares the
simulation results from the proposed and conventional simulation approaches on
the IEEE 39-bus power system and NPCC 48-machine, 140-bus power system
[97], [132]. Both simulation approaches are implemented in MATLAB. Timedomain simulations are performed by TSAT of Powertech Labs. Parameters in
test cases are following.
3.3.1 Selection of Parameters
In the DLF model, let Di = 1 pu for all loads in (3.1), and Ri = 0.0056 pu in
(3.2) for all generators, which is based on the system base (100 MVA) after the
conversion from the value of R in Table III based on the generator base. Let i =1
for all loads in AC-OPFf and AC-OPF models. Assume a maximum 0.5 Hz
frequency deviation in constraint (3.9k), i.e. fdmin=-0.5 Hz, fdmax=0.5 Hz. The
threshold to trigger the UFLS scheme is 59.5 Hz.
For generator frequency protection, set 0, fL , f1, fn, f2, and fU as 0.002, 57
Hz, 59.5Hz, 60Hz, 60.5Hz, 61.7Hz, respectively in (3.12). For transmission line
protection, let β=0.999,  =0.001, and  =10, the same as [39].
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Table 3-3. Parameters for the Turbine-Governor Model.
Parameter

Value

Unit

Speed regulation factor R

0.05

pu

Turbine damping coefficient Dt

0

pu

Main steam control valve max limit Vmax

1

pu

Main steam control valve min limit Vmin

0.3

pu

Governor time constant T1

0.5

s

Steam chest time constant T2

1.0

s

Reheater time constant T3

1.0

s

For time-domain simulation on the two-area system as a benchmark for
frequency, all generators use the 2nd order classic model equipped with steam
turbine-governor model “TGOV1” [133].
For the time-domain simulation on the NPCC power system, 24
generators are represented by a detailed round rotor model “GENROU” with an
exciter model “ESDC1A” with PSS/E v32. [134] and the other 24 generators use
the classic model. All generators are equipped with the “TGOV1” governor model
using the same parameters in Table 3-3. All loads are modeled as frequencydependent loads, i.e. “IEELBL” in PSS/E v32 and reactive powers of loads are
assumed to be constant.
Transmission capacity limit Sij,max of each line of the IEEE 39-bus system
is from the data with MATPOWER 6.0 toolbox. For the NPCC power system,
Sij,max of each line is generated by two steps: 1) finding initial limits to make sure
no overloading after any N-1 contingency; 2) increasing all limits by 20% to
ensure some reliability margin.
3.3.2 Tests on the Two-area System
The two-area system has loads at buses 7 and 9. To compare steadystate system frequencies from the DLF model and time-domain simulation, three
scenarios of load changes are tested: a) shedding the load on bus 7; b) shedding
loads on both buses; c) increasing loads on both buses.
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(a)

(b)

(c)
Figure 3-5. Frequency variations from the DPF model and time-domain simulation.

From Fig. 3-5, the steady-state frequencies from the DLF model in all
three scenarios match well the time-domain simulation results, which verifies the
accuracy of the steady-state frequency calculated from the DLF model.
3.3.3 Tests on the IEEE 39-bus System
The following four groups of tests are performed on the IEEE 39-bus
system, whose purposes are provided:
1) Verifying the accuracy of steady-state frequency and the convergence
characteristics with the DLF model. Two scenarios are designed, i.e. Scenarios 1
and 2.
2) Testing the UFLS and generator frequency protection module and the
influence of SPFCs of loads on frequency. One scenario is used, i.e. Scenario 3.
3) Studying the influence of active power generation limits on frequency.
Scenario 4 is designed to intentionally make the active power outputs of some
generators reach their generation limits after the line outages.
4) Comparing the simulated cascading outages from the proposed
approach based on Fig. 3-3 and conventional approach based on Fig. 3-4
statistically. Scenarios starting from all N-2 initial outages are considered.
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Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the above 1)-3) are shown on the IEEE 39-bus
system in Fig. 3-6, distinguished in color.

Figure 3-6. Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4 on the IEEE 39-bus system (outages are marked with
crosses and labeled with stages).

1) Verification of Steady-state Frequency

Scenario 1 represents the line outages without causing system separation,
and Scenario 2 represents the line outages that cause the system to separate
into islands. Those two typical scenarios both introduce major disturbances, i.e.
line outages, to cause large power imbalances and significant frequency
deviations. The steady-state values of frequencies following the line outages are
obtained from both the DLF model and time-domain simulation, and the results
are compared.
Scenario 1: trip line 10-32, line 17-18, and line 3-18 in stage 1 and then
trip line 25-37 in stage 2.
In time-domain simulation, two stages are intentionally separated by 100
seconds to make sure that the frequency can reach its steady-state before the
next outage. Frequencies from time-domain and the DLF model for all stages are
shown in Fig. 3-7. Only steady-state frequencies are compared. Generator 32 is
tripped at stage 2 and then generator 37 is tripped at stage 3. The frequencies
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calculated by the DLF model for the remaining system at stages 2 and 3 are
close to those from time-domain so as to verify the accuracy of frequency
calculated by the DLF model. The slight mismatch for the frequencies between
them is because the power flow results of them are not exactly the same.

(a) From time-domain simulation
(b) From the DPF model
Figure 3-7. Frequency variations of scenario 1.

Scenario 2: trip lines 2-25, 3-18 in stage 1 and trip line 17-27 in stage 2.
The system separates into two islands after line outages in stage 2,
including a main island with 8 generators and a smaller island with generators 37
and 38 indicated by a dashed box in Fig. 3-8. The steady-state frequencies from
the DLF model in stages 1 and 2 are very close to those from simulation as
compared in Fig. 3-8.

(a) From time-domain
(b) From the DPF model
Figure 3-8. Frequency variations of scenario 2.
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The convergence of N-R method in the DLF model is tested for Scenarios
1 and 2. Fig. 3-9 shows how mismatches of equations in solving the DLF model
changed with iterations for the two stages of outages. Mismatches drop below
the tolerance of 10-9 (pu) and power flows converge after 3 or 4 iterations. The
mismatch (y-axis) takes the largest value among all Pi and Qi at each
iteration.

(a) From Scenario 1
(b) From Scenario 2
Figure 3-9. Convergence of N-R method with the DLF model.
Table 3-4. Estimation of Convergence Rate of DLF Calculation.
Scenarios
Scenario 1
Scenario 2

Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 1
Stage 2

k=0
0.040
0.829
0.027
0.460

ρk
k=1
0.325
1.353
0.468
0.341

k=2
0.380
0.000
0.394
0.413

Iterations with the N-R method converge at a quadratic rate to the solution
when the initial guess is sufficiently close to the solution. For a series {xk}
converging to x* with a quadratic rate, eq. (3.13) should be satisfied [135][136].

| xk 1  x |
M
| xk  x |2

if M 

| h( x* ) |
2 | h( x* ) |

(3.13)

For the DLF model or a conventional power flow model, function h in
(3.13) represents (3.3) and (3.4) and h’ and h” are the first derivate and second
derivate of h. Treat the power flow results at the last iteration on the DLF as the
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solution x*. Table 3-4 calculates k 

| xk 1  x |
at each iteration step k of the N-R
| xk  x |2

method on the DLF model. From the results, the values of  k for different k’s are
basically of the same scale, which demonstrates quadratic convergence of the NR method in solving the DLF model.
2) Tests on UFLS and Generator Frequency Protection Module and Influence of
SPFCs of Load on Frequency
In the proposed approach for simulation of cascading outages, the UFLS
and generator frequency protection module in Fig. 3-2 will be activated together
with some scenarios. Here Scenario 3 tripping lines 32-10 and 38-29 is illustrated.
After tripping lines 32-10 and 38-29, the DLF model gives frequency
f=59.39Hz, which falls into the range of 57Hz to 59.5Hz. Then, the UFLS scheme
is triggered to shed 384.07MW load and then f increases to 59.55Hz. Since the
new frequency f after DLF falls into the range of 59.5Hz to 60.5Hz, generator
frequency protections are triggered at a probability of 0.002. Finally, in this
scenario, no generator is tripped.
Additionally, the influence of SPFCs of loads on frequency is analyzed in
Scenario 3. Fig. 3-10 shows that the larger the parameter D, the smaller is the
frequency deviation.

Figure 3-10. Frequency vs D of Scenario 3.

3) Influence of Active Power Generation Limits on Frequency
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Active power generation limits are considered in the DLF model. Here, the
impact of active power generation limits on frequency is studied on Scenario 4.
Table V compares active power outputs of generators and system frequencies
after tripping lines 10-32 and 25-37 with and without considering active power
generation limits, respectively.
From Table 3-5, the frequency deviation of -1.29Hz considering active
power generation limits is larger than the deviation of -0.49Hz without
considering active power generation limits. If some generators reach their active
power generation limits, their active power outputs will be fixed at the limits while
the other generators such as generator 31 with sufficient margin will continue
increasing active power. If active power generation limits are omitted, the
frequency deviation may be underestimated.
Table 3-5. Generator Power Outputs and System Frequencies.
Without limits
Generator

With limits

PGmax (MW)
PG (MW)

fd (Hz)

PG (MW)

30

350.00

395.66

350.00

31

1145.60

507.88

749.74

33

732.00

777.66

732.00

34

608.00

653.66

fd(Hz)

608.00
-0.49

750.00

-1.29

35

750.00

795.66

36

660.00

705.66

660.00

38

930.00

975.66

930.00

39

1100.00

1145.66

1100.00

32

750.00

-

-

-

-

37

640.00

-

-

-

-

4) Statistical Comparison of Two Simulation Approaches
Some indices evaluating the severity of cascading outages can be used to
compare the scenarios of cascading outages generated by the two approaches
based on Figs. 3-3 and 3-4, such as the number of line outages and amount of
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load shed. The cascading outage simulations of the two approaches are tested
and compared on cascading outage scenarios starting from all N-2 initial outages.
Note that the system is N-1 secure, or in other words, it has no overloaded line
after any N-1 line outage. Of all the 1035 pairs of cascading outage scenarios
derived by the two approaches, the ones which do not propagate beyond the
initial outages for both approaches are excluded from comparison. Totally
K=1028 scenarios for each approach are compared here.
Define the following two indices to compare the cascading outages
simulated by the two approaches.
Ri , path 

Load Ai
| Ai |
, Ri ,load 
, i  1, 2,.., K
| Bi |
Load Bi

(3.14)

where Ai and LoadAi are the set of line outages and amount of load shed on
scenario i of cascading outages from the conventional approach; Bi and LoadBi
are the set of line outages and amount of load shed on scenario i from the
proposed approach;  represents the number of elements in a set.

(a) Length of cascading outage
(b) Load shed of cascading outage
Figure 3-11. Ratios between two approaches.

Fig. 3-11(a) shows that for most scenarios, Ri,path<1, indicating that line
outages propagate more as simulated by the proposed approach than the
conventional approach. From Fig. 3-11(b) and Table 3-6, the proposed approach
tends to have more load shed than the conventional approach due to the
consideration of the UFLS scheme and generator frequency protection. It can be
inferred that the conventional approach underestimates the extent of outage
propagation due to ignoring frequency variations, frequency-related remedial
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actions and protections. The proposed approach better captures the propagation
of outages and losses of load due to frequency-related factors.
Furthermore, the overlaps between the sets of line outages of cascading
outages generated by two approaches are evaluated to compare the simulated
cascading outage paths. Define the average overlap ratio Ravg [56] for the sets of
line outages of cascading outages between two approaches as

Ravg 

| A  Bi |
1 K
Ri ,overlap , Ri ,overlap  i

| Ai  Bi |
K i 1

(3.15)

Ravg is 0.61, indicating distinct characteristics of outage propagations
simulated by the two approaches.
Table 3-6. Statistical Comparison of the Two Approaches with 1028 Samples.
Approaches
Conventional
Proposed

Average No. of
line outages
7.76
12.89

Average amount
of load shed (MW)
1848.9
3376.5

UFLS is triggered in 255 of the 1028 scenarios. The average, maximum,
and minimum amounts of load shed by UFLS scheme are 282.23MW,
599.60MW and 40.85MW, respectively. This study shows that if impacts of
frequency deviation and the UFLS scheme are ignored in simulation, the risk of
cascading outages will be underestimated.
3.3.4 Tests on the NPCC System
1) Verification of Steady-state Frequency

The steady-state frequency calculated by the DLF model is also verified
on the NPCC 48-machine, 140-bus power system.
Two scenarios (numbered Scenarios 5 and 6 below) of cascading outages
are selected for verifying the frequencies calculated by the DLF model. The
scenarios cause large active power imbalances leading to over- and underfrequency conditions. Note that the purpose of the tests here is only to verify the
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calculated steady-state frequency, so the AC-OPFf model, the UFLS scheme
and generator frequency protection module are deactivated in the two scenarios.
Scenario 5 has two stages of outages as listed in Table 3-7. The steadystate frequencies obtained from the DLF model and time-domain simulation are
compared in Table 3-8. Scenario 6 has three stages of outages shown by Table
3-9. The frequencies are compared in Table 3-10. From the comparisons, the
results derived from the DLF model is very close to the benchmarking results,
which verifies the accuracy for capturing the steady-state frequency by the DLF
model.
Table 3-7. Propagation Path of Cascading Outages in Scenario 5.
Stages
1
2

Line Outages
130-131, 131-133, 131-135, 131-139
124-128, 125-128, 126-128, 127-128,
128-130

Table 3-8. Comparison of Steady-state Frequencies for Scenario 5.
Approaches
DPF
Time-domain

Frequency (Hz)
Stage 1
Stage 2
60.137
60.244
60.147
60.268

Table 3-9. Propagation Path of Cascading Outages in Scenario 6.
Stages
1
2
3

Line Outages
85-86, 85-105
78-79
131-133, 132-133, 133-135

Table 3-10. Comparison of Steady-state Frequencies for Scenario 6.
Frequency (Hz)
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3
DPF
59.779
59.622
59.498
Time-domain
59.802
59.649
59.532
Note: three generators are tripped one by one after stages 1, 2 and 3.
Approaches

2) Detailed Comparison of Two Simulation Approaches
This section conducts detailed comparisons between the proposed
approach and conventional approaches on two more scenarios numbered 7 and
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8. Figs. 3-12-3-13 show the outage paths, amounts of load shed and frequency
variations of two scenarios.
For Scenario 7, the outage propagation paths from the same initial
outages simulated by two approaches are the same (in Fig. 3-12), and the
frequency deviation is not significant. After stage 2, the frequency only deviates
by -0.033Hz. After the line outages in stage 3, power flow calculations by the
DLF model and conventional power flow model both diverge, indicating system
stress, and then AC-OPF and AC-OPFf are invoked to find new operating points,
respectively. The system frequency after AC-OPFf is 60.498 Hz, which is within
the normal range, so the UFLS scheme is not triggered. After AC-OPF and ACOPFf, there are no other lines tripped and outages stop for both approaches. The
comparison on Scenario 7 indicates that the two approaches behave similarly
with small frequency deviation. However, with the proposed approach, the
operators can monitor the variation of system frequency, which is more practical
than the conventional approach.

Figure 3-12. Comparison of two approaches on Scenario 7.
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Figure 3-13. Comparison of two approaches on Scenario 8.

For Scenario 8, the outage propagation paths simulated by two
approaches from the same initial outage coincide at the first stage and then differ
from stage 2 (Fig. 3-13). In the simulation with the proposed approach, after line
outages at stage 2, the frequency deviation for the remaining system hits -0.51
Hz, so UFLS is triggered to shed load and recover the system frequency to
59.634 Hz. The frequency for the remaining system after stage 3 is 59.694 Hz
and UFLS is not further triggered. The outage propagations and the resulting
power flow profiles from the two approaches are relatively close in the first stage
and then become distinct from stage 2. This indicates that variations of system
frequency cannot be ignored during the propagation of cascading outage,
especially for the later stages of outages. Otherwise, the impacts of cascading
outages may be significantly underestimated.
3) Detailed Comparison of Two Simulation Approaches
A large number of cascading outage scenarios are simulated on the
NPCC system using the proposed and conventional approaches to further
compare the outage propagation patterns. Each scenario starts from an “N-2”
contingency.
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For the two approaches, Table 3-11 compares the average numbers of
line outages, the average amounts of load shed by remedial actions, and the
average amounts of load shed by the UFLS scheme in 10000 independent
scenarios. Cascading outages with the proposed approach tend to propagate
more and are more severe than those from the conventional approach. This
again indicates the significance of considering frequency variations and
frequency-related actions in the simulation of cascading outages.
Table 3-11. Statistical Comparison of the Two approaches with 10000 Samples.
Approaches
Conventional
Proposed

Average No. of
line outages
8.79
14.27

Average load
shed (MW)
222.45
985.02

Average load shed
by UFLS (MW)
0
146.97

The time performances of two approaches are tested on a desktop
computer with Intel Core i7-3770K 3.40GHz and 4GB RAM. The total time costs
for the same number of scenarios created by two approaches are compared in
Table 3-12. The proposed approach takes about 16% more time than the
conventional approach because for a number of scenarios with large frequency
deviations, the cascading outages simulated by the proposed approach
propagate for more stages and hence require more N-R computations.
Table 3-12. Comparison in Time Performance
Number of scenarios
10000

3.4

Conventional approach
14.50 hours

Proposed approach
16.78 hours

Conclusion of this Chapter
In this chapter, a novel steady-state cascading outage simulation

approach is proposed, which integrates a DLF model and a novel AC-OPFf
model considering frequency deviation. The chapter discusses the significance of
considering frequency variations in simulation of cascading outages. The
proposed approach can accurately capture the steady-state frequency. Also, the
proposed AC-OPFf model considering frequency deviation can simulate the
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control actions against system collapse. Thus, the proposed approach is able to
model loss of load due to both frequency insecurity and voltage collapse, and
hence can better match practical grid operations than the conventional steadystate approach that ignores the variation of frequency. The proposed approach
enables the modeling of frequency related remedial actions and protections such
as UFLS scheme and generator frequency protection. The frequency calculated
by the DLF model has been benchmarked with time-domain simulation results on
both small and large systems. Detailed and statistical comparisons between the
proposed and conventional approaches have been conducted to demonstrate the
merits of the proposed approach. The proposed approach only focuses on
capturing steady-state frequency variations in the simulation of cascading
outages and is unable to provide detailed dynamic behaviors of frequency
following each disturbance.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CRITICAL COMPONENT-BASED ACTIVE ISLANDING
FOR REDUCING CASCADING OUTAGE RISK
4.1

Introduction
According to [9], basically, the procedure of cascading outage can be

divided into two phases, which are remarked by slow phase and fast phase. If the
cascading outage propagates to the fast phase, a fast transient instability
process unfolds resulting in a collapse of the entire system [137]. However, it is
possible for the system operators to evaluate the system status and take some
remedial and control actions to prevent the propagation of cascading outages.
Many remedial actions have been reported in [138]. These remedial actions
include generator excitation, re-dispatch of generation, load shedding, generator
tripping, and Intentional controlled islanding (ICI).
Intentional controlled islanding (ICI) has been proposed as an effective
remedial action [139, 140] for systems under emergency status [139–143]. After
a severe contingency, ICI intentionally separates the power system into several
self-sustaining isolated islands. Generally, to obtain an islanding solution, ICI can
be formulated as a constrained optimization problem. However, to solve this
optimization problem in real-time or within a limited timeframe such as a few
seconds is extremely complicated and the complexity increases exponentially
with the system size [144–149]. To search for the set of lines splitting the system,
multiple constraints need to be considered. Some typical constraints include
load-generation balance, coherency generator, thermal limits, voltage and
transient stability. It is very complicated obtain a solution with a limited timeframe
with considering all the constraints. It is practical to consider only part of the
constraints [151]. Among these constraints, the constraint generator coherency is
crucial for successful controlled islanding since it enhances the transient stability
of the islands [146, 147, 152]. The existing ICI approaches can be classified as
92

two classes. The objective of the first class is to minimize power imbalance [143–
149]. The objective of second class is to minimize power flow disruption [150,
151, 153]. These approaches may obtain different islanding solutions but they
can be regarded as ‘NP-hard’ searching problems [154]. For these problems,
there is no general ‘polynomial time’ algorithm to find the optimal solution [155].
More efficient methods should be investigated in order to realize fast searching
for the islanding solution [146–148].
For the second class approaches, Spectral clustering-based methods have
been proposed [156], belonging to graph theoretic techniques. The eigenvalues
and eigenvectors of a matrix representing the power system can be calculated to
determine the islanding solution within ‘polynomial time’. Even though this
method requires less computation burden, it does not include the generator
coherency constraint. Later, a spectral clustering controlled islanding (SCCI)
algorithm has been introduced in [151]. The SCCI algorithm minimizes the power
flow disruption, while ensuring that each island contains only coherent
generators. However, an islanding solution can only be directly determined when
the number of islands is two.
In this chapter, the perspective for studying active islanding is quite
different with the existing researches. It is assumed that the set of lines that
splitting the power system into islands are predefined. It is a reasonable since the
tie lines connecting to the remaining system for an area operated by the ISO are
always under monitoring and the strategy for isolating this area is also
predesigned. The focus of this chapter is to investigate the effective stage to
perform active islanding during the propagation of cascading outages. A critical
component-based active islanding for reducing the cascading outage risk is
proposed. Critical components whose fail can cause large cascading outage risk
are identified based on the interaction graph. With the propagation of outages, if
any component belonging to the critical components is involved in this cascade,
active islanding will be performed in real time to change the propagation path of
outages in order to reduce the cascading outage risk. The remaining sections are
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organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the proposed strategy of active
islanding in detail. Section 4.3 tests the proposed strategy of active islanding on
an NPCC power system and validates it. Conclusion is drawn in Section 4.4.

4.2

Proposed Strategy of Active Islanding

4.2.1 Illustration of Active Islanding
Here one scenario of cascading outage on the NPCC power system is
used to illustrate the procedure for performing active islanding. This scenario
contains twelve line outages involved in four stages.
Stage 1: Lines 1-2 and 1-21.
Stage 2: Line 6-7.
Stage 3: Lines 7-8, 9-30, and 30-31.
Stage 4: Lines 32-35, 35-39(double lines), 37-39, 50-52 and 52-54.
A simulator for the simulation of cascading outage is shown by Fig. 4-1.

Figure 4-1. Simulation procedure of cascading outage without active islanding.

The DC power flow results show that there are no overloaded lines after
line outages in stage 4. The propagation of cascading outage stops. These line
outages are remarked by colors in Fig. 4-2.
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Figure 4-2. One scenario of cascading outage without active islanding.

Figure 4-3. One scenario of cascading outage with active islanding.
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As comparison, when line 7-6 becomes overloaded with the propagation
of outages following the same initial line outages, rather than tripping it, active
islanding is performed to isolate ISO New England area, then lines 29-37 and 3573 are tripped intentionally. After performing active islanding, the DC power flow
results show that lines 7-8, 8-9, 9-30, and 30-31 become overloaded and they
are tripped in the next stage. After tripping them, they are no other overloaded
lines. They are remarked by colors in Fig. 4-3.
By comparing Figs. 4-2 and 4-3, we can know that the propagation path of
outages has been changed after performing active islanding. This strategy is
effective if the cascading outage risk of Fig. 4-3 is smaller than that of Fig. 4-2.
Then two problems need to be answered. First, for one scenario of
outages, should active islanding be performed? Second, if the answer is yes,
which stage to perform active islanding?
In this chapter, a strategy of critical component-based active islanding is
proposed to reduce the cascading outage risk online. The basic idea is to
perform active islanding when any critical component whose fail can cause large
cascading outage risk is involved in the propagation path. The identification of
critical components is based on the interaction graph constructed offline.
4.2.2 Critical Components With Interaction Graph
In [27], the interaction graph comprising by the key links and components
is constructed. A link i → j is quantified for the criticality to the propagation of
cascading outages in terms of amount of load shed, which is remarked by link
weight I ij :
I ij 

1
Nij

Nij

Ls ,m

m 1

N s 1,m N s ,m

 Iij ,m , Iij ,m  k1

(4.1)

where I ij ,m represents the link weight for the link i → j in the m-th cascade; Ls, m is
the amount of load shed at the generation s of m-th cascade; Ns-1,m and Ns,m are
the numbers of line outages at the generations s-1 and s of the m-th cascade;
96

N ij is the number of cascades involving the link i → j; k1 is the non-negative
scaling parameters.
A unique subgraph influenced by the link i → j can be extracted from the
interaction graph shown by Fig. 4-4.

Ni

i
Pij
j
Pja

Pjb

a
Pac

b
Pad

c

Pbe
d

e

Figure 4-4. Subgraph influenced by the link i → j.

For the link i → j, Pij represents the occurrence probability of link i → j.

Pij 

Nij
Ni

(4.2)

where N i is the number of times of component outage i.
The expected load shed triggered by the link i → j and other links in the
subgraph is defined as
COCij 

where

 (ij ) is



l ( ij )

Rl ; Rl  Pcs PI
l l

(4.3)

the set of links in the subgraph influenced by the link i → j; Pcs is

the occurrence probability of the source component outage of link l.

97

Figure 4-5. Component i and involved links.

The links involved in component i are shown by Fig. 4.5. The total risk in
terms of amount of load shed triggered by the component i is defined as:
Si 

 COC

c ( i )

ic

(4.4)

where  (i) is the set of components starting from component i.
The top ranking components with large Si can be regarded as critical
compoents, remarked by Cb. They are crucial to the cascading outage risk in
terms of load shed.
4.2.3 Strategies of Active Islanding
The basic idea of the proposed active islanding can be described: with the
propagation of outages, when any component belonging to the set of critical
components becomes overloaded which means it is involved in the propagation
path of outages, rather than tripping it, active islanding is performed intentionally
to change the propagation path of outages. It is named as critical componentbased active islanding in this chapter.
As comparison, another non-critical component-based active islanding is
proposed. With the propagation of outages, if any component not belonging to
the set of critical components becomes overloaded, active islanding will be
performed instantaneously.
The effectiveness of the critical component-based active islanding can be
verified if the cascading outage risk in those scenarios performing active
islanding can be reduced. However, for the strategy of non-critical componentbased active islanding, it can increase the cascading outage risk in those
scenarios performing active islanding. Based on the above two strategies, two
simulation procedures of cascading outages are shown by Figs. 4-6-4-7.
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Figure 4-6. Simulation procedure of cascading outages with the strategy of critical componentbased active islanding.

Figure 4-7. Simulation procedure of cascading outages with the strategy of non-critical
component-based active islanding.

99

4.3

Case Studies
The proposed strategies of active islanding are tested and compared on

the NPCC power system. For simplicity, it is assumed that the area for isolation
is pre-determined that is to isolate ISO New England area. We do not consider
isolating other areas in the strategy of active islanding. Then the initial "N-2"
component outages located in the ISO New England area are considered. The
number is 861.
4.3.1 Different Classes of Cascades
Here seven classes of cascades are simulated, which are remarked by:
Class 1: 861 original cascades without active islanding following the
procedure in Fig. 4.1 are simulated.
Classes 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6: 861 cascades with active islanding following the
procedure in Fig. 4-6 are simulate in each class. 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 critical
components are used, respectively.
Class 7: 861 cascades with active islanding following the procedure in Fig.
4-7 are simulated.
Remarks:
1) The cascades in Class 1 are also used for identifying the critical
components.
2) For each cascade of Class 2, active islanding will be performed
instantaneously if any component belonging to the 10 critical components is
involved in stage 2 or the later stages.
3) For Classes 3, 4, 5, and 6, the difference when compared with Class 2
is the number of critical components used.
4) For each cascade of Class 7, active islanding will be performed
instantaneously if any component rather than 50 critical components is involved
in stage 2 or the later stages.
4.3.2 Comparison between Different Classes
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For different classes, the number of cascades that performing active
islanding is different. It is shown in Fig. 4-8.

Figure 4-8. Number of cascades performing active islanding.

From Fig. 4-8, we can know that the number of cascades performing
active islanding increases with the increased number of critical components.
In order to compare the variation of cascading outage risk, for each
cascade that performing active islanding in Classes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, the
amount of load load is compared with that of the corresponding cascade in Class
1 following the same initial outages. They are shown in Figs. 4-9-4-11.
For Figs. 4-9-4-11, the average amount of load shed between different
classes of cascades is compared and listed in Table 4-1. Here we consider six
comparisons between different classes.
Comparison 1: Class 1 \& Class 2
Comparison 2: Class 1 \& Class 3
Comparison 3: Class 1 \& Class 4
Comparison 4: Class 1 \& Class 5
Comparison 5: Class 1 \& Class 6
Comparison 6: Class 1 \& Class 7
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(a) Class 1 and Class 2

(b) Class 1 and Class 3

Figure 4-9. Comparison of load shed between cascades with and without active islanding for
Classes 1, 2, and 3.

(a) Class 1 and Class 4

(b) Class 1 and Class 5

Figure 4-10. Comparison of load shed between cascades with and without active islanding for
Classes 1, 4, and 5.

(a) Class 1 and Class 6

(b) Class 1 and Class 7

Figure 4-11. Comparison of load shed between cascades with and without active islanding for
Classes 1, 6, and 7.
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Table 4-1. Average Amount of Load Shed
Comparison number

Class 1

Compared Class

1

3064.1MW

1605.3MW

2

2958.9MW

1680.5MW

3

2517.5MW

1608.4MW

4

2098.2MW

1584.9MW

5

2145.1MW

1611.3MW

6

1474.8MW

1823.5MW

From Table 4-1, we can know that the cascading outage risk has
decreased for the class (Classes 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) with critical component-based
active islanding when compared with the cascades without active islanding. The
cascading outage risk has increased for the class (Class 7) with non-critical
component-based active islanding when compared with the cascades without
active islanding.
Specifically, active islanding is performed in 43 cascades for Class 2,
among these cascades, the amount of load loss for 40 cascades with active
islanding is smaller than that of the original cascades without active islanding.
The average amount of load loss for 40 cascades with and without active
islanding is 1569.6MW and 3151.5MW.
For Class 3, active islanding is performed in 48 cascades, among these
cascades, the amount of load loss for 39 cascades with active islanding is
smaller than that of the original cascades without active islanding. The average
amount of load loss for 39 cascades with and without active islanding is
1578.0MW and 3165.4MW.
For Class 4, active islanding is performed in 69 cascades, among these
cascades, the amount of load loss for 40 cascades with active islanding is
smaller than that of the original cascades without active islanding. The average
amount of load loss for 40 cascades with and without active islanding is
1569.6MW and 3151.5MW.
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For Class 5, active islanding is performed in 114 cascades, among these
cascades, the amount of load shed for 77 cascades with active islanding is
smaller than that of the original cascades without active islanding. The average
amount of load shed for 77 cascades with and without active islanding is
1561.6MW and 2423.5MW.
For Class 6, active islanding is performed in 118 cascades, among these
cascades, the amount of load shed for the 79 cascades with active islanding is
smaller than that of the original cascades without active islanding. The average
amount of load shed for 79 cascades with and without active islanding is
1556.8MW and 2243.2MW.
For Class 7, active islanding is performed in 119 cascades, among them,
the amount of load loss for 96 cascades is larger than that of the corresponding
cascades without active islanding. The average amount of load loss for 96
cascades with and without active islanding is 1725.5MW and 1128.1MW,
respectively.
4.3.3 Selection of Number of Critical Components
Here the ratio for the number of cascades with reduced cascading outage
risk for different number of critical components is given by Fig. 4-12.

Figure 4-12. Ratio of the number of cascades.
(with reduced and equal risk: consider the cascades with reduced and equal risk; with reduced
risk: consider the cascades with reduced risk)
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From Fig. 4-12, we can know that the ratio for the strategy of critical
component-based active islanding is much higher than that of non-critical
component-based active islanding, which verifies the effectiveness and high
accuracy of proposed critical component-based active islanding. The larger the
ratio is, the better the performance is. With the increasing number of critical
components, the performance will change. Considering the cascades with
reduced and equal risk, the ratio will increase and then decrease. The strategy
with 30 critical components has the best performance. By only considering the
cascades with reduced risk, the ratio will decrease and then increase. It suggests
that it is better to select 10 critical components in order to have a good
performance.

Figure 4-13. Average reduced amount of load shed for those cascades with reduced risk.

Fig. 4-13 gives the average reduced amount of load shed for those
cascades not only performing active islanding but also reducing the amount of
load shed when compared with the corresponding cascades without active
islanding. For 10, 20, and 30 critical components, the performance for reducing
the amount of load shed is stable. However, the performance becomes worse
when the amount of critical components reaches to 40. This suggests to select
10, 20, or 30 critical components.
Fig. 4-14 gives the ratio of the number of cascades for those cascades not
only performing active islanding but also increasing the amount of load shed
when compared with the corresponding cascades without active islanding. Fig. 4105

15 gives the average increased amount of load shed. With the increasing number
of critical components, the average increased amount of load shed decreases
first and then increases. This suggests it is better to select 30 critical
components.
By combing the results from Figs. 4-12-4-15, we would like to recommend
10 critical components to be used.

Figure 4-14. Ratio of the number of cascades with increased risk.

Figure 4-15. Average increased amount of load shed for those cascades with increased risk.

4.4

Conclusion of this Chapter
An online strategy of critical component-based active islanding designed

to perform online with the propagation of outages to reduce the cascading outage
risk is proposed. Active islanding will be performed instantaneously if any critical
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component whose fail can cause large cascading outage in terms of load shed is
involved in order to change the propagation path of cascading outage and reduce
cascading outage risk. The critical components are identified based on the
interaction graph constructed offline. Tests on the NPCC power system validate
the proposed strategy of active islanding.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORKS
5.1

Summary
A test bed based on the Northeastern Power Coordinating Council

(NPCC) 48-machine, 140-bus power system model for simulating cascading
outages is developed. Then a multi-layer interaction graph on cascading outages
of power systems is proposed as an extension of the single-layer interaction
model. This multi-layer interaction graph provides a practical framework for
prediction of outage propagation and decision making on mitigation actions. It
has multiple layers to respectively identify key components and key intra-layer
links of components within each layer and key inter-layer links between layers,
which contribute the most to outage propagation. Each layer focuses on one of
several aspects that are critical for system operators’ decision support, such as
the number of line outages, the amount of load shedding, and the electrical
distance of outage propagation. Besides, the proposed integrated mitigation
strategies can limit the propagation of cascading outages by weakening key
links.
A novel dynamic load flow (DLF) model for cascading outage simulation
considering static power-frequency characteristics (SPFCs) of generators and
loads is proposed such that system frequency deviations due to active power
imbalance can be calculated during cascading outages. Further, a new AC
optimal power flow model considering frequency deviation (AC-OPFf) is
proposed to represent remedial control actions when system collapse happens
as indicated by power flows divergence. Test results verify that the proposed
approach can capture frequency variations under cascading outages and
simulate the mechanism of outage propagation more accurately.
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A strategy of active islanding designed to perform in real time with the
propagation of outages to reduce the potential cascading outage risk is
proposed. In order to mitigate cascading outages, active islanding will be
performed if critical branches whose fail can cause a huge loss of load are
involved. The critical branches are identified based on the interaction graph
offline. Tests on the NPCC power system validate the proposed strategy of active
islanding.

5.2

Future Works
The future works will be:
1) Integration of the steady-state simulation approach proposed in Chapter

3 and time-domain simulation for an efficient hybrid simulation approach for
cascading outages.
2) Investigation of more effective online strategies for reducing the
cascading outage risk based on the multi-layer interaction graph.
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